



# **WGB**

## **Impact on national defence policies**

# The consequences of the war in Ukraine - How does it affect our countries?

**XXVIIIth European Days of State Territorial Representatives,**

**Malmö, SWEDEN,**

**Friday April 14<sup>th</sup> 2023 9am-12:30am**

**Work Group B: Impact on national defence policies (the question of NATO, new direct threats and specific challenges for countries with critical borders, preparation of civilian populations for new military threats)**

The Group worked in a hybrid way with 13 colleagues on-site representing Finland, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany and Albania from North-East to South-East and 5 colleagues on line, representing Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Moldova and Ukraine. The list of participants also gives the positions of the participants.

# WG B - Impact on national defence


Chairperson: Anne AZAM PRADEILLES and Reporter: Marko PUKKINEN

Country	Surname First Name	Function
Albania	JOLE Nertil	Prefect of Korça Region
France	AZAM-PRADEILLES Anne	Civil Administrator (Hon) International expert in Public Administration Reform
	JASPERS Jean-Martin	Ministry of Interior Delegate for Artificial Intelligence
	LATRON Patrice	Prefect of Indre-et-Loire
Finland	AINASOJA Kaisa	Director General, Regional State Administrative Agency for Lapland
	LAHTI Soile	Director General, Regional State Administrative Agency for Eastern Finland
	LEHTOVIRTA Jaana	Head of Preparedness
	PUKKINEN Marko	Director General, Regional State Administrative Agency for Western and Inland Finland
	RASANEN Leena	Director General, Regional State Administrative Agency for Southwestern Finland
	SAVOLAINEN Terttu	Director General, Regional State Administrative Agency for Northern Finland
Germany	WEINMEISTER Mark	President of District, Hesse
Norway	KARLSEN Tom Cato	Country Governor of Nordland
Sweden	HULTHÉN Anneli	Governor of Skane County
Lithuania	STONKUTE Eglė	Director of Baltic Institute for Research and Development, Vilnius and Associate Professor at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas
Poland	ZUKROWSKA Katarzyna	
Romania	MATES Ioana	Platforma 30, Bucharest
Moldova	Maria PRISACARI	Director of North Regional Development Agency
Ukraine	Vira NANIVSKA and Sofiya SHUTIAK	Former President of National Academy of Public Administration and director of ICPS, International Centre for Policy Studies, and Senior Policy and Legal Analyst, lawyer

# WGB -Impact on national defence policies

- The question of NATO
- New direct threats and specific challenges for *countries with critical borders*
- Preparation of civilian populations for new military threats

1. Russia - Finnish border (+Norway)
2. Russia - Baltic states border
3. Suwalki corridor
4. Åland and Gotland
5. Danish islands
6. Belarus border
7. Russia - Ukraine war
8. Transnistria
9. Bosphorus strait



# NATO



# Resilience through Civil Preparedness in NATO

Three Core Functions and Seven NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience



**Assured Continuity of Government and Critical Government Services**



**Resilient Energy Supplies**



**Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled Movement of People**



**Resilient Food and Water Resources**



**Ability to deal with Mass Casualties**



**Resilient Civil Communication Systems**



**Resilient Civil Transportation Systems**



# Seven NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience


1. Assured **continuity of government** and critical government services: for instance, the ability to make decisions, communicate them and enforce them in a crisis;
2. Resilient **energy supplies**: back-up plans and power grids, internally and across borders;
3. Ability to deal effectively with **uncontrolled movement of people**, and to de-conflict these movements from NATO's military deployments;
4. Resilient **food and water resources**: ensuring these supplies are safe from disruption or sabotage;
5. Ability to deal with **mass casualties and disruptive health crises**: ensuring that civilian health systems can cope and that sufficient medical supplies are stocked and secure;
6. Resilient **civil communications systems**: ensuring that telecommunications and cyber networks function even under crisis conditions, with sufficient back-up capacity.
7. Resilient **transport systems**: ensuring that NATO forces can move across Alliance territory rapidly and that civilian services can rely on transportation networks, even in a crisis.

# NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT

## 29.6.2022

- 49 items
- Collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security
- A tightened and increasingly complex security environment
- A change in the attitude towards Russia, the importance of China becoming more prominent
- The transatlantic relationship is important, the USA supports Europe
- The materialization of the threat of war, the strengthening of the importance of NATO's military role



**JAKE11**  
United States - US Air Force (USAF) 

#1 Worldwide Tracked by 6,976 



NATO is monitoring eastern border (of NATO)

<https://www.flightradar24.com/JAKE11/2f9fca34>



N/A  N/A

 AIRCRAFT TYPE (R135)  
**Boeing RC-135W Rivet Joint**


REGISTRATION	COUNTRY OF REG.
<b>62-4131</b>	
SERIAL NUMBER (MSN)	AGE
	

 Recent 62-4131 flights 

 CALIBRATED ALTITUDE	VERTICAL SPEED
<b>30,975 ft</b>	
GPS ALTITUDE	TRACK
	<b>201°</b>

 Speed & altitude graph 

 GROUND SPEED	TRUE AIRSPEED
<b>352 kts</b>	






# European Union

# A Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defence in the next decade

- Provides an analysis of our strategic environment and seeks to bring greater coherence and a strong common sense of purpose to the EU's security and defence efforts.
- A guide for action, providing concrete proposals and timelines for the coming 5-10 years in four areas:
  1. Act more quickly and decisively when facing crises;
  2. Secure our citizens against fast-changing threats;
  3. Invest in the capabilities and technologies we need;
  4. Partner with others to achieve common goals.

*NB: Defense (US spelling), Defence (UK/EU spelling)*





Norway

- **The general organisation of defence in Norway is all governed by the central government, under the Ministry of Defence.**
- **The Norwegian Armed Forces are divided into four branches; the Norwegian Army, the Royal Norwegian Air Force, the Royal Norwegian Navy, and the Home Guard. The different units are spread all over Norway, with the day-to-day operations being controlled by the Norwegian Joint Headquarters.**
- **The Home Guard is divided into 11 geographical units, which are in close contact with the 10 county governors in Norway and cooperate closely together with also the police and other national emergency services, whenever there's a crisis.**
- **The defence budget in Norway, is (as of February 10<sup>th</sup> 2023) at 1,43% of the GDP. This is the case after the defence budget was at a higher percentage of the GDP in 2022, AND there was an increase in the defence budget from 2022 to 2023 by 600 million Euro. The explanation for this, is that Norwegian economy is growing rapidly, so the GDP is increasing faster than the increases in the defence budget.**

- **Norway shares a 197,7 km border (on land) with Russia in the North.**
- **There has been periodically increased activity with unknown drones in Norway after the invasion of Ukraine.**
- **Several Russian drone-operators have been arrested inside Norway, and there are periodical challenges with radar-jamming from the Russians, affecting civil aviation in the North of Norway.**
- **One Russian spy, working at one of our universities, under cover of being Brazilian, has also been arrested and is awaiting trial. We have also experienced one former Wagner soldier escaping from Russia to Norway, over the heavily guarded border.**

- **When it comes to civil preparedness, there has been several campaigns to get people in Norway to be able to be self-sustained for a minimum of three days, when it comes to food, water, medicine and heat.**
- **Most civilian bomb-shelters have been neglected for decades, and many of them are sold to different private companies, who use them for storage. The government has started mapping all the shelters during 2022, to see what will be the needs when it comes to getting these shelters up and running.**
- **42.256 Ukrainians have claimed asylum in Norway since Russia invaded Ukraine. 19.466 women, 9526 men, and 13.264 children. The municipalities have done a great job with welcoming them to their cities and villages, and there is a huge will to aid and assist Ukrainians, both those who come to Norway, and those remaining in Ukraine.**



Finland

# Longest External Border of European Union




 @AVItwilttaa



# Finnish-Russian Border

- 1 343,6 kilometres, external border of EU.
- Controlled and patrolled by the Finnish Border Guard and the Border Guard Service of Russia.
- On the Finnish side
  - On foot or skis at and near the border
  - Air Patrol Squadron's helicopters and planes
  - Land vehicles, snowmobiles and boats
  - Dogs trained in tracking
  - Technical surveillance systems
- The Finnish Border Guard is now constructing a barrier fence on the eastern border.
  - The construction work will take 3–4 years.
- Currently, restrictions on the entry of Russian citizens.
- Border remains stable, Russian border guards operate normally. RSAA well informed.





“

**From Russian  
Empire to  
independence,  
via YYA-treaty  
to EU and Nato**



## Finnish-Russian relations

- During centuries, Finnish-Russian relations have been both warm and cool, fluctuating with time.
- Russia has an embassy in Helsinki, a consulate-general in Turku, consulate in Mariehamn and an honorary consulate in Kuusamo
- Finland has an embassy in Moscow, a consulate-general in Saint Petersburg and two branches of the consulate (in Murmansk and Petrozavodsk).
- Russians in Finland constitute a linguistic and ethnic minority of 1.3% of the population.
- From the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 until 2010, about 25,000 Ingrian Finns moved from Russia and Estonia to Finland, where they were eligible for automatic residence permits under the Finnish Law of Return.

# After the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine

- Finland, as one of the EU countries, imposed sanctions on Russia, and Russia added all EU countries to the list of "unfriendly nations".
  - Electricity supplies from Russia to Finland suspended from May 2022.
- Support among the Finnish populace for NATO membership increased from below 30% to 60-70%.
  - On 18 May 2022, Finland formally applied to join NATO, simultaneously with Sweden. **Finland became a member on 4 April 2023.**
- Finnish Aliens Act was amended in July 2022 and now enables introduction of border procedure at the Finnish border if an exceptionally large number of people were to arrive in Finland over a short period of time or if hybrid influence activities that exploit migration were directed against Finland.
  - During the 2015 migration crisis, there was an increase in the numbers of migrants seeking asylum at the northern section of the Finnish-Russian border (from September 2015 to February 2016).
  - The opening and closing of the Arctic migration route leading via Russia to Finland was most likely a deliberate demonstration by the Russian authorities.



# Baltic Sea – Critical Islands

- Åland Islands (Finland)
- Gotland (Sweden)






**Åland is an autonomous, demilitarised, Swedish-speaking region of Finland**



Sweden

# Swedish Total Defence



**“Total defence”** denotes all activities needed to prepare Sweden for war and comprises both military and civil defence. Civil defence refers to society as a whole’s resilience in the event of the threat of war and actual war.

**Civil defence** refers to the work carried out by central government agencies, local authorities, regions, private companies, and voluntary organisations to protect the civilian population and to ensure that health care services and transport systems, for example, work. Sweden’s civil defence is also tasked with supporting Sweden’s Armed Forces.

Sweden’s **military defence** comprises the Swedish Armed Forces and the Home Guard, together with several other authorities. The Armed Forces defend our territory and our borders.



Lithuania



# IMPACT ON NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICIES

## Lithuania's case

**Assoc. Prof. Dr. Eglė Stonkutė**

Director of the Baltic Institute for Research and Development

European Days of the European Association of State Territorial  
Representatives (AERTE / EASTR)

2023 – 04 - 14

# C-Stress. Stress tests for the National Defence Policy

- *Belorussia – Lithuania border (illegal immigration – hybrid war...)*
- *The beginning of the Russia – Ukraine war.*
- *Kaliningrad transit issue coming with sanctions.*
- *Flow in of Ukrainians, Belarussians.*
- *Lithuanian natives from Kaliningrad, sensitive issues concerning immigrants from Russia and Belorussia.*
- *Lithuania's defence policy development directions. Suwalki Gap.*
- *Lithuania's social society resistance development directions.*

## *Belorussia – Lithuania border (illegal immigration – hybrid war...)*

- As of 30 July 2021, a total of 3,284 migrants have been recorded:
  - >2,000 from Iraq,
  - 165 from Congo,
  - 105 from Cameroon,
  - 55 from Russia,
  - 53 from Guinea,
  - 43 from Iran,
  - 34 from Afghanistan,
  - 16 from Somalia and
  - 10 each from Turkey, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Syria.
- 71% of the migrants are men, mostly aged between 20 and 29 years.

# *The beginning of the Russia – Ukraine war*


- Strong and unabated Lithuania's support for Ukraine.
- Feeling of the war coming to our country.
- Iodine pills are always in my handbag.

# *Kaliningrad transit issue coming with sanctions*

- Lithuania's over reaction in all (USA sanctions at the end of 2021).
- Implementation of EU sanctions - overheated situation in Suwalki gap.

# Flow in of Ukrainians, Belarussians, Russians and their companies

Source: <https://migracija.lrv.lt/lt/naujienos/lietuvoje-rekordiskai-daug-gyvenanciu-uzsienieciu-ju-skaicius-augo-del-karo-ukrainoje-ir-darbo-imigracijos>.




*Lithuanian natives from Kaliningrad, sensitive issues concerning immigrants from Russia and Belorussia*

- Lithuanian nationals being mobilized by the Russian army.
- Their immigration in Lithuania under question and open mistrust.

# *Lithuania's defence policy development directions.*


## *Defence budget on the rise*

Source: <https://kam.lt/faktai-ir-skaiciai/gynybos-biudzetas/>.



# Main budget allocations in 2022

Source: <https://kam.lt/faktai-ir-skaiciai/gynybos-biudzetas/>.



# *Lithuania: Organisation of defence 1/2*

- According to the Constitution, the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
- Defence of the Republic of Lithuania is directly responsible for planning the national defence system.
- The Commander of the Armed Forces, who is entrusted with the command of the entire Lithuanian Armed Forces in time of war, is under the authority of the Minister of National Defence.
- The preparation of the defence and mobilisation plans is the responsibility of the Defence Headquarters.

# *Organisation of defence 1/2*

- The Lithuanian army consists of:
- Regular Forces: consisting of:
  - Insignia of the Lithuanian Land Force svg. Land Forces;
    - Insignia of the National Defence Volunteer Forces (Lithuania);
  - Insignia of the Lithuanian Air Force;
  - Insignia of the Lithuanian Naval;
  - Insignia of the Special Operations Forces.

# *Suwalki Gap*



# *Lithuania's civil society resistance development directions*

- Some 3000 people until now have been trained.
- For now no clear improvements into that area (trainings).

## *Other sensitive issues*

- Brigade of Germany on the ground of Lithuania.
- Lithuania's home works being skipped while arguing hard.
- Diverging opinion of the leaders of the Army and Politicians over the physical (provision of strategic military weapons and equipment) support to Ukraine.



**Poland**

# Poland

Threats caused by the Russian invasion on Ukraine in  
February 2022

# Structure

- Basic information
- Threats, challenges, risks - types
- Ways of eliminating or diminishing those threats
- Polish support for Ukraine

**POLSKA – MAPA PODSTAWOWA**  
1 : 2 000 000

Skala 1 : 2 000 000  
0 100 km



-  granica Polski
-  granice sąsiednich państw
- granice rzeczne (znak wyłącznie dotykowy)
-  stolica
-  miasta
-  rzeki
-  jeziora naturalne
-  zbiorniki sztuczne
-  linia brzegowa
-  morze

**Objaśnienia skrótów w brajlu**

- bu – Bug; rzeka
- la – Łaba; rzeka
- na – Narew; rzeka
- nl – Nysa Łużycka; rzeka
- nm – Niemiec; rzeka
- nt – Noteć; rzeka
- od – Odra; rzeka
- pl – Pilica; rzeka
- sa – San; rzeka
- we – Wełtawa; rzeka
- wr – Warta; rzeka
- ws – Wisła; rzeka

**Wykaz kluczy przed skrótami w brajlu**

- m – morza
- punkty 3 i 6 – rzeki
- punkty 3, 5 i 6 – jeziora
- n – niziny
- w – wyżyny
- g – góry
- punkty 4, 5 i 6 – szczyty



# Basic information

- Borders with 7 states (NATO members: Germany, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Lithuania; applicant for NATO and EU membership – Ukraine; non-NATO members: Russia, Belorussia),
- NATO membership - 1999; EU membership 2004;
- Location central Europe
- Area 312,696 km<sup>2</sup>
- 38 Mn inhabitants (5th most populated state in the EU)

# Challenges, threats, risks

Challenges	Threats	Risks
Covid	Budget deficit	Financial stability
Inflation	Putin inflation	Value of zloty
War on borders	Bordering with 3 states engaged in war	Consequences
Refugees (from Belorussia, Ukraine)	Syrian refugees, Ukraine refugees	Numerous consequences
Support (aid for Ukraine)	Engagement	Financial consequences
Buildup of the military potential	Started	Financial consequences (4%)
Internal political situation	Parliamentary elections Autumn 2023	Media, social divide, demonstrations

# Polish military power – international rankings

- Meeting requirements of NATO membership (concerning military expenditure, equipment of troops, etc.)
- According to the Global Firepower ranking (2003) the Polish Army is the 20th world military power, overtaking German Army (25th) or Spain (21st).
- Military expenditures in Poland are US\$ 20,66 bl, 18th position in world in this area.
- The Polish Army is in 3rd position in the European Union after France and Italy and the 6th position in NATO
- Arms trade: in 2022 Polish arms exports jumped up (€909,32m)

# Economy

- Classification to group: emerging/developing, high income economy
- 6th largest in the EU by nominal GDP and 5th largest by nominal GDP (PPP)
- 22nd largest economy in the world
- GDP growth 0,6%
- Inflation 17,2%
- Unemployment 5,5%
- Current account -1,9%
- Budget balance -3,0%
- Currency 2,5%

# Polish support for Ukraine

- Humanitarian support
- Arms delivery
- Support for refugees
- Actions acknowledging about the disaster
- Training Ukrainian soldiers to use the western advanced equipment
- Volunteers fighting in Ukraine

# What Poland does to improve security

- Increase of MILEX to 4% of GDP (declaration in Washington during the meeting of PM Mateusz Morawiecki with VPOTUS Kamala Harris)
- Upgrading the military potential
- What is weak? Local defence, territorial defence, training

# Conclusions

- Support
- Big threat
- Strong weaknesses not easy to eliminate



Germany



## WG B – Impact on national defense policies

Mark Weinmeister,  
*Regierungspräsident*  
*Regierungspräsidium Kassel*


## GENERAL ORGANISATION OF DEFENCE IN GERMANY

- The federal government, represented by the Ministry of Defence, is responsible for organising defence, but the final decisions can only be made with an absolute majority of the Bundestag (Parliamentary army)
- The role of the Bundeswehr is described in the Constitution of Germany (Art. 87a) as absolutely defensive only. After a ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 the term "defence" has been defined to not only include protection of the borders of Germany, but also crisis reaction and conflict prevention, or more broadly as guarding the security of Germany anywhere in the world
- Following concerns from the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Germany announced a major shift in policy, pledging a €100 billion special fund for the Bundeswehr – to remedy years of underinvestment – along with raising the budget to above 2% GDP (Last years between 1.3 and 1.5 %)
- Regional authorities are not able to instruct the Bundeswehr, but there are connection commands on every national level (*Bundesländer, Regierungsbezirke, Landkreise*) to work together in the case of crisis.

## IMPACT OF WAR IN UKRAINE

- Managing refugees from Ukraine (at the moment 1.1 million people in Germany).
- 80.000 in Hessen
- Expanding living spaces, schools, day care centres etc.
- Critical infrastructure protection has been strengthened
- More practice of courses of action in the event of a crisis
- From 1945 – 1990 Northern Hesse was „front area“, now military action is possible once again
- Energy dependency must come to an end. Faster expansion of renewables
- Defence companies in our region need opportunities to expand





France

# Defence in France: a brief overview of the doctrine, organisation and budget (1)

- ▶ **In France defence is a global concept** composed of three branches military defence, civil defence and economic defence. The constitution provides that the chief of the armies is the president of the Republic, who presides the Council of Defence. The Prime Minister with his / her government implements the decisions taken during the meetings of the councils of defence. Military budget programming laws are voted every seven years. When a reform is needed a “white book” is prepared after a wide consultation and with a participative approach.
- ▶ For a long time, a great number of texts have regulated the field of defence. They have recently been gathered and organised in **the code of defence** voted as a law by Parliament. The process of codification started in 2004 and the first law validating the legislative part was voted in 2005. It is an on-going process to include the new texts. It is divided in two parts the first part is the codification of all the laws and the second part is devoted to all the bylaws called decrees in France.

# Defence in France: a brief overview of the doctrine, organisation and budget (2)

- ▶ For **the implementation of the policy of defence**, the Prime Minister is assisted by all the ministers notably the minister of defence for military defence, the minister of economy and finance for economic defence and the minister of interior for civil defence.
- ▶ In order to coordinate the action of all the ministries, the Prime Minister has a **General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN)**.
- ▶ For training and awareness raising about the spirit of defence, **an Institute of Higher Studies for National Defence, (IHEDN)**, created in 1945 at the same time as the National School of Public Administration (ENA).
- ▶ In each ministry, there is a **High Level Defence Civil Servant (HFD in French)** in charge of defence in the field of the ministry.
- ▶ All these HFDs are coordinated by the SGDSN.

# Defence in France: a brief overview of the doctrine, organisation and budget (3)

- ▶ France is divided in 13 Regions in metropolitan France plus 5 overseas and 101 Departments, including the island of Mayotte near Madagascar. For defence, France is divided in **seven Defence Zone in metropolitan France and five Defence Zones overseas**. There are some specificities for the bigger Defence Zones, notably Paris.
- ▶ At the head of the Defence Zones there is a **Defence Zone Prefect** who in matters of defence is placed hierarchically over Region and Department prefects. The Defence Zone prefect is assisted by a Delegate Prefect for Defence and National Security.
- ▶ **A Defence Zone General Secretariat for Defence and National Security** mirrors the national SGDSN. It coordinates the lower levels, Regions and Departments. In a Defence Zone, Region prefects will bring their support in economic defence with the support of the General Director of Public Finance who represents the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

# Defence in France: a brief overview of the doctrine, organisation and budget (4)

- ▶ At the lowest level of territorial governance, the level of the Communes or Municipalities – which are Self-Governments, the mayor has some administrative police delegated to him / her. In case of a big crisis, the prefect may substitute himself / herself to the mayor.
- ▶ **At each level, there is a representative of the Ministry of Defence in charge of military affairs.** At the Defence Zone level, a military commander heads all the military forces. In case of war, the power may be transferred from the Defence Zone prefect to the Military commander of the zone but only with a decree taken in the Council of Ministers (cf. Defence Code).
- ▶ **To measure the impact of the war in Ukraine**, a prospective analysis of the state of the French army has been made: doctrine, methods, human resources, armaments etc. The assessment is severe. A big exercise took place with 6000 men in the South of France to assess the state of preparedness.
- ▶ The lessons learnt from the weaknesses identified led to the political decision of stopping the reduction of the expenditures on defence and of greatly increasing its budget from 32 Billion EUR in 2017 to 69 Billion in 2030 – **an increase of 3 or 4 Billion per year and a total of 413 Billion in 7 years.**

# Defence in France: The General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN)

- ▶ **The SGDSN is a Prime minister's body dedicated to design and implement security and defence policies.** It provides advice and support to the political decision-making process.
- ▶ Its areas of expertise include all strategic defence and security matters, such as military programs, nuclear deterrence, internal security as part of national security, economic and energy security, counter-terrorism and crisis response plans.
- ▶ **The SGDSN fulfills three main missions :**
  - ▶ it is responsible for monitoring security threats, preparing governmental plans and coordinating public crisis management ;
  - ▶ it advises the government and takes part in the drafting of bills and decrees relating to matters of security and defence ;
  - ▶ it carries out a variety of operational tasks, ranging from security clearance and classified document management to the protection of governmental communications (via the *Centre de transmissions gouvernemental*) and cybersecurity. A national agency within SGDSN (ANSSI, *Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information*) is specifically in charge of the latter.
- ▶ The SGDSN also oversees *the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (IHEDN)*.

## LÉGENDE

-  Participation aux missions de l'OTAN
-  Pays où sont prépositionnés les battle group de l'OTAN
-  Soutien associé
-  Déploiement permanent



## ENGAGEMENT FRANÇAIS SUR LE FLANC EST UN DISPOSITIF MILITAIRE AUX CAPACITÉS RENFORCÉES

### ATLANTIQUE - MÉDITERRANÉE

- Contribution au sein des :
  - Standing NATO Maritime Groups 1 & 2
  - Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups 1 & 2 (Guerre des mines)



### MULTINATIONAL BATTLEGROUP - ESTONIE (LYNX)



- enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) - présence avancée renforcée



### eAP

 **4 Rafale** pendant **4 Mois**

- enhanced Air Policing (eAP) - mission de police du ciel

### AIR SHIELDING



- Missions de surveillance et de défense aérienne
- Exercices interalliés


### MULTINATIONAL BATTLEGROUP - ROUMANIE (AIGLE)



- Battle group multinational aux capacités renforcées
- Système de défense sol-air moyenne portée (MAMBA)
- Élément préfigureur d'un état-major de brigade interarmes renforçable sur très court préavis - BFCE<sup>1</sup>
- Échelon de soutien national



# L'INTELLIGENCE ARTIFICIELLE SUR LE CHAMP DE BATAILLE



# WHERE CAN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE USE IN DEFENSE?

## TRAINING

Simulation and training utilize systems and models by using software engineering principles.

## SURVEILLANCE

AI and computer vision assist us with target identification and classification with robotic MPs, and they can provide alert notifications as well.

## ARMS & AMMUNITION

Artificial Intelligence Embedded Technology is at the core of the new generation of weapons.

## CYBER SECURITY

Machine learning can help defense establishments detect and prevent unauthorized involvement.

## LOGISTICS

Machine learning, geospatial analysis, and military logistics can reduce errors, time, and effort significantly.

## DATA INTEGRATION

Defense Artificial Intelligence can collect sensor and satellite data and submit and remove conclusions

## MILITARY ROBOT

Military robots can conduct operations without the aid of soldiers in an accurate and compact manner.

BLUE AI



Albania

# Organisation of the Armed Forces in the Republic of Albania

## ▶ HEADQUARTERS OF ARMED FORCES

- ▶ Mission: Development, direction and coordination of a joint military force, with land sea and air components, capable of fulfilling its constitutional mission, preserving the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, protecting and supporting the civilian population in peace, war crisis, to contribute to peace and security in the wider region, as well as to support and engage in the Euro-Atlantic cooperation and integration processes and other regional initiatives in the field of security.

## ▶ LAND FORCE

- ▶ Mission: Ensuring and maintaining the readiness of the necessary capacities operational for the preservation and protection of independence, sovereignty and the territory of the Albanian Republic in cooperation with other structures of the Armed Forces and NATO, the support of the population in the face of natural disasters in times of peace, crisis and war, as well as participation in operations in the framework of collective defence.

## ▶ AIR FORCE

- ▶ Mission: Ensuring the necessary capacities for surveillance and control airspace sovereignty of the Albanian Republic in cooperation with NATO, the support in combat and non-combat operations, those we seek rescue, as well as the realization of command-control of air vehicles in the airline space of the Albanian Republic.

# Organisation of the Armed Forces in the Republic of Albania

## ▶ **SUPPORTING COMMAND**

- ▶ Mission: Ensuring the capacities for logistic and infrastructure support, health service and other services of the Armed Forces in interest of completing their constitutional mission as well as ensuring the necessary operational capacities for combat operations, civil emergencies, search and rescue, humanitarian and aid community operations in cooperation with other structures of the Armed Forces.
- ▶ The supporting command to fulfill its mission depends on these dependent structures:
  - ▶ - Civil Emergency Support Base (Military Department No. 4030)
  - ▶ - Training Centre (Military Department No. 4003)
  - ▶ - Supply Battalion (Military Department No. 4006)
  - ▶ - Transport Battalion (Military Department No. 4007)
  - ▶ - FA technical repair and maintenance centre
  - ▶ - FA Central Laboratory (Military Department No. 4010)
  - ▶ - Genius Battalion (Military Department No. 4040)

# Organisation of the Armed Forces in the Republic of Albania

- ▶ Civil Emergency Support Base (Military Department No. 4030), otherwise known as BMEC located in Ferraj, Tirana, is a subordinate structure of the Support Command, which has the following sub-departments:
  - ▶ **1. Korce Regional** Support Detachment (DMR Korce)
  - ▶ 2. Gjirokaster Regional Support Detachment (DMR Gjirokaster)
  - ▶ 3. Kukes Regional Support Detachment (DMR Kukes)
  - ▶ 4. Burrel Regional Support Detachment (DMR Burrel)
- ▶ The mission of all DMRs is to ensure the necessary operational capacities for carrying out combat operations, **civil emergencies**, search for rescue, humanitarian operations and those in aid of the community in cooperation with other structures of the Armed Forces as well as us cooperation with local units of local government.

# Albania - Defence Budget

Sector	Budgetary expenses of the Defence Sector in % of GDP 2022-2025			
	Budget of 2022	Budget of 2023	Budget of 2024	Budget of 2025
<b>Defence</b>	1.75 %	1.85 %	2.00 %	2.00 %



Romania



# ROMANIA





**Ioana Mateș** is a lawyer, a member of the Bucharest Bar, specialised in the field of criminal law, with extensive experience in the field of defending civil rights and freedoms.

Ioana is also President of Project ROMANIA 2030 , one of the new relevant think tanks in Romania, and as well she is involved in promoting a project on the institution of the whistleblower, aimed at combating corruption and organised crime.

She perfected her postgraduate studies at the National School of Political and Administrative Studies, in the field of international relations, graduating from the Master's courses in International Relations – Conflict Analysis and Resolution, and as well she holds a Master Degree in NATO STUDIES.

She graduated from the postgraduate courses of the National Defence College, being specialised in studies on the security of the Middle East and collaborating on numerous occasions in this area, as a specialist. She has published articles in the field of civilian oversight over intelligence services, international relations and security in the Middle East.



## Direct threats for ROMANIA :

1. **Direct military threats to Romania's security, including the potential for a Russian invasion or attack.**
2. **Increased military presence and activity near Romania's borders, which could pose a direct threat to the country's security .**
3. **The potential for Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns to undermine Romania's stability and democracy.**
4. **The potential for cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure, such as power grids and communication networks, which could disrupt essential services and compromise national security.**
5. **The potential for Russian interference in Romania's domestic affairs, including attempts to influence political and economic decision-making.**
6. **The potential for a disruption in energy supplies.**
7. **The potential for increased terrorist activity and the use of unconventional warfare tactics by Russian-backed proxies.**
8. **The potential for destabilization in the wider Black Sea region, including the possibility of increased regional conflicts and instability.**
9. **The potential for a significant influx of refugees and the associated social, economic, and security challenges this could bring.**



## CHALLENGES FOR ROMANIA (1/2)

- 1. The need to secure critical infrastructure, including power and communication networks, to ensure their continuity.**
- 2. The need to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and to integrate them into host communities.**
- 3. The possibility of a significant flow of refugees into Romania, which would put a strain on social and economic infrastructure.**
- 4. The potential for economic disruptions, including damage to trade relationships and supply chains.**
- 5. The need to establish effective crisis communication and public awareness campaigns to inform the population about the risks and emergency response measures.**
- 6. The potential for terrorist attacks or other forms of non-traditional warfare, including cyberattacks.**
- 7. The need to invest in military technology and capabilities to counter new threats, including possible developments in Russian military technology.**
- 8. The potential for proxy wars and the involvement of other state or non-state actors in the conflict.**



## CHALLENGES FOR ROMANIA (2/2)

9. **The need for enhanced intelligence sharing and coordination among NATO member states.**
10. **The need to ensure the continuity of critical services, including healthcare and emergency response, during a prolonged conflict.**
11. **The potential for a breakdown in regional cooperation and the rise of nationalist sentiments .**
12. **The potential for long-term environmental damage from military operations, including damage to PROTECTED SITES, water sources and agricultural lands.**
13. **The need to establish effective border control and screening procedures to**
14. **ensure the safety and security of both refugees and host communities.**
15. **The potential for Russia to use information warfare and propaganda to sow discord and confusion in Romania and among its NATO allies.**
16. **The potential for a large influx of refugees and the need to provide humanitarian assistance and shelter to them.**
17. **The need for effective military and civilian preparedness measures, including conducting regular drills and exercises to maintain readiness.**



## Preparation of civilian populations for new military threats (1/2)

- 1. Establish a comprehensive emergency preparedness plan: The Romanian government should develop a comprehensive plan that outlines emergency procedures, evacuation routes, and sheltering options in the event of military conflict.**
- 2. Conduct regular drills and exercises: The government should conduct regular drills and exercises to familiarize citizens with emergency procedures and improve readiness.**
- 3. Increase public awareness and education: Public awareness campaigns can educate citizens about emergency procedures, basic survival skills, and potential threats.**
- 4. Establish community support networks: The government should establish community support networks to provide essential supplies, shelter, and other necessary services to those in need.**
- 5. Provide access to healthcare and counseling services: Access to healthcare and counseling services may be limited during military conflicts, so the government should establish contingency plans to ensure that citizens have access to these essential services.**



## Preparation of civilian populations for new military threats (2/2)

- 6. Stockpile emergency supplies: The government should stockpile emergency supplies such as food, water, and medical supplies in advance of potential conflicts.**
- 7. Invest in critical infrastructure: The government should invest in critical infrastructure such as power and communication networks to ensure that these systems remain operational during conflicts.**
- 8. Provide access to information: The government should provide citizens with accurate and timely information about potential threats, emergency procedures, and available resources.**
- 9. Establish communication channels with neighboring countries: The government should establish communication channels with neighboring countries to coordinate emergency response efforts.**
- 10. Work with NATO and other allies to coordinate emergency response efforts**

# Moldova





Moldova is positioned to be of the countries most affected by the war in Ukraine due to its proximity, and heavy reliance on commodity imports from Ukraine and Russia.



Over 755,368 people had entered Moldova from Ukraine, and 102,160 have registered as Ukrainian refugees and 6,065 third-country nationals have remained in Moldova (UNHCR Jan 2023).



Nearly 4% reside in Refugee Accommodation Centers (RACs) provided by the government, while 65% stay in hosted or rented accommodation (UHCR Protection database)





The North Regional Development Agency does not have any attribution with regard to military defence or refugees, there are other national institutions responsible for this field of intervention.



Our project envisaged support activities to local public authorities and North Regional Development Council representatives in the context of crisis /emergency situations.



One of the activities was the acquisition and subsequently, transmission of goods for 11 rayon councils in the North Development Region and the Balti municipal council.



Thus, according to the indicated priorities, 12 generators, 12 fire-fighting sets, 360 sets of bed linen were purchased that will contribute to improving the effects of crisis situations.



Also, there were enhanced communication skills during crisis situations of 70 regional stakeholders from the North Region.



The North RDA also elaborated an action plan in crisis situations for the institution to be applied in the emergency situations and have trained members of the Regional Development Council how to act in crisis situations.



Other direct involvement with refugees we did not have.



**Ukraine**



Vira NANIVSKA

Founder of the analytical centre  
Collegium of Anna Yaroslavivna

Ex President of the National  
Academy for Public  
Administration under the  
President of Ukraine




Sofiya SHUTIAK

Attorney, deputy head of  
environmental law commety

Phd student of Public Administration of  
Ukraine National Forestrial University  
Senior Policy Expert

We worked together on environmental reforms  
and wil work on public administration reform



Украина

Молдавия

Румыния

Одесса

Николаев

Кривой Рог

Запорожье

Мариуполь

Донецк

Днепр

Павлоград

Полтава

Харьков

Киев

Чернигов

Житомир

Львов

Люблин  
Lublin

Воронеж

Курск

Старый Оскол

Лиски

Урюпинск

Белгород

Россошь

Луцк

Ровно

Коростень

Сумы

Борисполь

Белая Церковь

Черкассы

Кременчуг

Кропивницкий

Умань

Ивано-Франковск

Черновцы

Сучава  
Suceava

Яссы  
Iași

Кишинев  
Chișinău

Бакэу  
Bacău

Клуж  
Cluj-Napoca

Тыргу-Муреш  
Târgu Mureș

Галац  
Galati

Браила  
Brăila

Питешти  
Pitești

Бухарест  
București

Крайова  
Craiova

Констанца  
Constanța

Евпатория

Севастополь

Ялта

Анапа

Новороссийск

Геленджик

Краснодар

Ставрополь

Шахты

Новочеркасск

Волгодонск

Борисоглебск

Пат

# Ukraine: the impact of the war



## From chaos to

1. **Strong country with powerful local and public administration**
2. **Good management**
3. **Financial sustainability**

# UKRAINE : Restore territorial governance at the local, regional and national levels

## Challenges:

- Security
- Legal status of officials who remained working under occupation
- Inventory of resources
- Planning for recovery remotely or on-site?
- The interaction of law enforcement and regulatory authorities



## UKRAINE: Organize work with government officials by

- Social and psychological support
- Material support - safety of movement; safety of work; safety of residence
- Data collection and exchange - areas of mined areas; economic resources; calculation of losses; recording of crimes
- Improving interaction and coordination between all authorities
- Control and supervision - including self-control



# UKRAINE: Methods of achieving targets

- Preparation of analytical materials based on data collection, analysis, and discussion with crisis survivors and those who will return to the crisis;
- Training: in-person, online; writing methodological materials;
- Data collection, monitoring, analysis and review of needs

Through whom it is carried out

- Invited experts
- Local experts



“

**How do we  
proceed?**



## WGB - Conclusions

- Information to public
- Importance of civil preparedness
- Recognise naivety – how big impact Russia has every day
- Spirit of defence
- Funding of civil defence
- Network of EASTR members