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Transitions, Crises and Territorial Action

Summaries of the EASTR
Conferences 2021-2025





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Ignazio PORTELLI

→ President of the EASTR

A shared reflection, more necessary than ever

Over the years, the European Days of Territorial Representatives of the State have established themselves as a place for dialogue, comparison and reflection on the major transformations affecting our societies.

This document is fully in keeping with that ambition. It brings together the summaries of the four most recent conferences organised by the EASTR between 2021 and 2025, in Florence, Malmö, Izmir and Valencia. Its title, “Transitions, crises and territorial actions”, reflects the guiding thread of these meetings. It highlights the profound changes facing our European States, the shocks they face and the adaptive capacity that public authorities must continually strengthen.

Through these pages, you will find the richness of the exchanges devoted to major issues such as the protection of heritage, the management of health crises, the consequences of the war in Ukraine, natural disasters and sustainable development. These summaries do not claim to restore the full richness of the proceedings published after each conference. They do, however, offer an informed reading, faithful to the major lessons shared, seeking – sometimes with the benefit of hindsight – to identify broader guiding principles in the face of challenges that may appear increasingly complex.

Indeed, in today’s global context, marked by geopolitical instability, intensifying climate crises, social tensions, technological upheavals and the fragility of trust in public action, this reflection is more necessary than ever. Faced with these intertwined crises, no territory can think through its responses alone. More than ever, AERTE has a vocation to keep alive a space for European exchange, experience-sharing and vigilance in support of territorial public action.

Throughout these contributions, one constant emerges: everywhere, the territorial representative of the State remains an actor of connection, coordination, trust and adaptation, working as closely as possible to human, institutional and territorial realities. The themes addressed in recent years show how this function is being called upon, but also how it is constantly being renewed, without ever losing sight of its primary purpose: serving the public interest.

This publication also bears witness to the vitality of the EASTR and to its determination to nurture concrete European reflection, rooted in experience on the ground. I hope that it will enable each of us to grasp the continuities, changes and responsibilities that structure our work today.





Valencia, **Spain**

(May 8 - 10, 2025)

State Territorial Representatives and Sustainable Development

Sustainable development is not confined either to environmental issues or to the ecological transition alone. It also entails solidarity between States and territories, social cohesion in the face of contemporary fractures, and the resilience of societies when confronted with crises. The role of territorial representatives of the State is central in coordinating public action, maintaining trust and supporting ongoing transformations. Three priorities emerge from this: anticipation, cooperation and adaptation.



At the opening protocol session, Mr Ignazio Portelli, President of the EASTR,¹ outlined the long tradition of the European Days of Territorial Representatives of the State, which consisted in providing clarifications and analyses on the role of TENs from the most varied thematic angles.² The choice of ‘sustainable development’ as the theme of the 30th JERTE is fully in line with this heritage and has given rise to rich debates. It was recalled that sustainable development is a process that reconciles both social and economic progress and environmental protection with the aim of not compromising the capacities of future generations.³ All the debates consisted in analyzing its fundamental and protean challenges in the territories according to a comparative dimension between the various countries represented. The debates were structured around the five sessions that provided so many spotlights on this topic of ‘sustainable development’: climate change (particularly against the backdrop of the dramatic Spanish floods of 2024);⁴ demographic transition;⁵ sustainable tourism;⁶ transparency and security policies⁷ and, finally, the exploration of the role and contributions of ‘artificial intelligence’ in the context of systemic and hybrid crises.⁸

In line with this very broad approach to the topic, the problem was as follows: what ‘common values’⁹ should be promoted by representatives of the State in the territories and, more broadly, by all public authorities, with a view to meeting the challenges of sustainable development and meeting its challenges? In the light of the debates, it appears that three words recur repeatedly: Solidarity, Cohesion and Resilience. They clearly draw the three main axes of the work resulting from these 30th JERTE.

SOLIDARITY

It was pointed out that climate change ‘does not know borders’¹⁰ because it is a global issue. However, it appears that certain areas, particularly in the Mediterranean,¹¹ are more exposed and more severely hit by intense weather phenomena (rains and spectacular floods ‘DANA’ in Spain,¹² persistent droughts in Sicily,¹³ forest fires, etc.). These climate events follow one another at a frequency never seen before in Europe, and recent years’ statistics on the reality of climate change speak for themselves.¹⁴ In this context, the concept of ‘solidarity’, international and above all European, is now particularly acute and is presented as the ‘pillar’ of civil protection.¹⁵ European solidarity during the floods in the Valencia region has been underlined on several

occasions.¹⁶ The ‘European Union Civil Protection Mechanism’ (UCPM) created in 2001 now plays an essential role in terms of solidarity (financial provisions, common ‘modules’ such as canadairs, emergency facilities for populations, etc.).¹⁷



Climate change does not know borders

The future of the UCPM was also discussed and in particular its deepening (to non-EU countries, ultramarine territories, etc.). In particular, it appears that two aspects, among others, constitute points of vigilance: in the background is the issue of the sovereignty of states in crisis management and that of security risks related to “hybrid” wars (e.g. by causing forest fires ...) ¹⁸

COHESION

The cohesion sought is part of a dual societal and territorial dimension. The many factors that could undermine the cohesion of our societies were set out in the debates: the proliferation of fake news,¹⁹ the ageing of the population,²⁰ difficulties in accessing public services in the rural sector²¹ and, more broadly, societal inequalities affecting the most vulnerable ... These phenomena contribute to fragmenting our societies and can sometimes feed eruptive popular manifestations such as ‘yellow vests’ in France. To overcome these difficulties and strengthen territorial cohesion, solutions must be sought both in the ‘territorialisation’ of public policies and in the quest for the ‘most balanced’ appropriate governance possible.²² In this context, Ms Miryam Alvarez Paez, Secretary General of the Territorial Coordination of the Ministry of Territorial Policy and Democratic Memory (Spain) gave a broad description of the Spanish regionalised system: a strong process of decentralisation, a logic of subsidiarity to strengthen territorial cohesion, local governance (municipal, supra-municipal and autonomous communities) and ‘normative dialogue’ between the ‘center and the periphery’, the role of government delegates and sub-delegates, ‘regionalisation à la carte’ according to an evolving process in terms of competences, for example. The result is a system that is quite complex institutionally and normatively but adapted to the context of a ‘plural’ Spain²³ (multilingualism, etc.).

The overall idea is to ensure that the ‘peripheries’ are taken into account as closely as possible, particularly in rural areas. The latter point has been raised several times. The aim is to ensure both ‘city-country’ complementarity (e.g. the ‘Namur 2030 Programme’)²⁴ and to avoid, as far as possible, the digital divide vis-à-vis the most vulnerable populations. One of the challenges is to ensure efficient access to social rights. In a context of strong digitalisation of public services, the efforts made by the Spanish ‘Administration near you’ programme are essential²⁵ to ensure access to social rights and benefits for the poorest, but many challenges also concern young people.

 *One of the challenges is to ensure efficient access to social rights*

More broadly, the debates have demonstrated the importance of maintaining quality public service activities based on a logic of proximity to enable the sustainable development of territories in a context of demographic transition and climate change. Proactive public policies (Spanish ‘active ageing’ plan, combating ‘degraded housing’ in France and Spain, ‘Fund for the local energy transition’, improving ‘mobility’ for the elderly, maintaining local shops and ‘services to the public’ in rural areas, etc.) make it possible to establish a certain ‘sustainability’ in the development of territories. The implementation of a ‘sustainable circular economy’ enables citizens to become agents of change themselves (e.g. loans between individuals via the ‘Library of Things’, etc.). In the same vein, it is a question of camping a ‘sustainable tourism’ (particularly in certain highly touristic Spanish regions) to ensure better ‘social and environmental sustainability’²⁶ (better management of water, waste, coastal quality, etc.). In this context, the Spanish ‘delegates’ are the ‘hands and ears’ of the government in order to anchor this territorialisation in a logic of proximity and subsidiarity.²⁷

Improving territorial cohesion also requires an approach of transparency and trust towards citizens, which must be reflected in normative terms and in terms of public policies (e.g. the Spanish ‘ALIA’ model of open data and data governance).²⁸

Francisco Martin Aguirre, Delegate of the Spanish Government in Madrid, referred in this context to the concept of “open government” combining

democratic values and “transparency”. “Open government”²⁹ is fully part of a “confidence in citizens” approach.³⁰ It is then a question of implementing not only ‘anticorruption instruments’ but also of prioritising ‘the co-creation of public policies with citizens’³¹ according to a ‘normative approach based on transparency’ and, more generally, of encamping a ‘new, more agile administration’ (e.g. the SIAGE system constituting a ‘code of good administration based on 8 elements such as ethics, simplicity, etc.’).³² The challenge is significant, since it is simply a matter of ‘rebuilding citizens’ trust’.³³ This also includes investments in artificial intelligence and information technologies (augmented reality, etc.), cybersecurity to combat fake news and civic education.

According to the same logic of “open government”, the Polish Voivode of Mazovia, Mariusz Frankowski focused more specifically on “social resilience to crises via the emergency response system in Poland”. He referred in particular to the system of “civil defense” in force since 1 Jan. 2025, which aims to ensure better “social resilience” in the face of crisis situations in general (e.g. forest fires, etc.) and more specifically war (e.g. temporary shelters, etc.) according to a multi-level governance method. This system is interconnected and is fully part of a partnership and collaborative approach with the various civil and military administrations to ensure all the necessary ‘cohesion’. In this context, the Governor of course has a wide range of civil protection tools at his disposal, but he must specifically ensure the ‘fight against disinformation and enable the proper dissemination of information’ in line with a ‘social resilience’ approach. He must be that ‘reliable interlocutor’ referred to by the mayor of Utiel, a municipality in the province of Valencia heavily affected by the floods referred to above.³⁴ More generally, the TEN’s central role must enable it to spread a “true culture of prevention and public awareness” while “stimulating services and planning emergencies”³⁵ in the event of a crisis. It is one of the tools at the service of ‘cohesion’ to develop ‘resilience and coordination capacities’ at territorial level.

RESILIENCE

Territorial resilience to natural and technological disasters practically refers to a territory’s capacity to adapt and organise – regarded as a system – so that it can cope with harmful events to the best of its ability. Upstream, resilience is first and foremost part of a holistic planning approach. Fundamentally, the aim



is to ensure 'urban planning' that takes account of urban pressure³⁶ (e.g. in Brabant in the Netherlands), the development of coastal areas (fighting against floods, etc.), the introduction of new construction methods (e.g. anti-seismic standards in Türkiye, etc.), the 'greening of urban planning'³⁷ (e.g. to combat global warming and heatwave temperatures, etc.), the best possible protection of biodiversity, and the development of renewable energies to reduce energy dependence (e.g. wind turbines in the Netherlands, etc.). In short, it is a matter of building 'resilient urban planning'³⁸ based on 'strategic planning'.³⁹

This resilience in crisis prevention is also reflected at various levels, as demonstrated by the speakers. First of all, it is a question of better 'water management' and 'available space' (e.g. development parks enabling 'nature and industry' to join hands in the Netherlands).⁴⁰ Resilience also requires the establishment of a more sustainable proximity 'circular economy' enabling citizens to become 'actors for change'.⁴¹ It also involves implementing 'sustainable tourism' that is more respectful of the environment and more qualitative in terms of culture and identity (e.g. sustainable tourism in the Spanish hinterland, the Namur 2030 plan to become the European Capital of Culture, etc.). This "resilient tourism"⁴² must be "planned" to be optimized (e.g. the "500 plans" of Spanish tourism sustainability aimed at better management of flows and preservation of natural spaces). The "tourist-citizen" is also destined to become an actor of change. It appears that "tourism is particularly affected by climate change". In France, the 'Plan d'Adaptation au Change Climatique (PNACC3)', presented at the beginning of 2025, specifically contains measures to 'accompany the adaptation of tourism'.⁴³ A similar approach exists in Belgium with the 'Air Climate Plan' (included in the 'Namur 2030' application referred to above)⁴⁴ which aims to camp 'more resilient cities in terms of tourism',⁴⁵ particularly in terms of ecology and energy (see also the 'more resilient' management of tourist accommodation following the DANA, for example).⁴⁶

Resilience is of course also part of a logic of emergency and crisis planning. It is then a question of ensuring the 'construction' of a multi-level governance of civil protection actors (establishment of new prevention protocols, simulation exercises, etc.) capable of enabling the emergence of a 'risk culture'. Planning also requires the best possible use of new technologies (smart early warning systems, AI and mass evacuation 'for more inclusive and resilient territories'⁴⁷ in 'a context of major systemic and hybrid risks' (e.g. Belgian ESA-SAFE-BXL project on the evacuation of a football stadium),⁴⁸ AI and anticipation of emergency situations, etc.).⁴⁹

At the heart of the institutional set-up, the TEN is in a position to 'enable the various public authorities to collaborate'⁵⁰ and to ensure 'coordination and cooperation between the various administrations',⁵¹ which are essential in the event of a crisis (earthquakes, electric blackouts in Spain, etc.). In the context of the floods (DANA referred to above) in the Valencia region, more than 40,000 staff had to be managed.⁵²



Resilience is of course also part of a logic of emergency and crisis planning

The Spanish (CCOPAL) and Turkish 'emergency plan' were set out. They have in common, of course, to be very structured and built on 'multi-level cooperation'⁵³ and 'multi-stakeholders'. This coordination role is also part of the management of 'volunteer staff', which is a real challenge at the peak of the crisis (e.g. the management of farmers who came to help spontaneously during the floods in Utiel, Spain, etc.). The TEN must manage the flow of information, ensure the immediate response of State services and ensure the involvement of all administrations.⁵⁴ In the post-crisis period, resilience must be part of the 'reconstruction' phase in order to minimise future risks.⁵⁵ This includes a more efficient use of public aid dedicated to post-disaster reconstruction. To manage that aid, it is necessary to 'work in a network'.⁵⁶ It is also about improving protocols and procedures related to reconstruction.



To conclude these two days of intense debate on the issue of sustainable development, it appears that the changes at work (climate change, energy poverty, demographic transition, etc.) are impacting our societies and are bringing 'uncertainties'⁵⁷ in terms of social and territorial cohesion. At the same time, territorial resilience offers adaptability and organisational capacity to the territories in which the TENS are able to act as closely as possible to the citizens. In particular, this action was able to accompany and guide the tremendous momentum of solidarity (European and territorial) that spontaneously manifested itself for the victims in the face of the situation generated at the time of the floods linked to the 'DANA' phenomenon in the Valencia region.





NOTES

1 Ignazio Portelli, President of ANFACI, State Commissioner for Sicily (Italy).

2 On this occasion, Mr Portelli stressed the importance of relations 'between the center and the periphery' and the presence of TENs in accordance with a logic of subsidiarity beyond the legal form of the various Member States (unitary, federal, regionalised, etc.). He also recalled the importance of the 'network work' provided by the EASTR (support from the EU, the Belgian and French Min. de l'Int., archives kept in Florence, etc.) and the 'common values' of its members.

3 Saffet Arıkan Bedük, Chairman of the Turkish Governors' Association (Türkiye), 'Sustainable development approach by territorial representatives of the state in Türkiye'.

4 Session 1: Emergency management and international cooperation in the context of climate change.

5 Session 2: Territorial cohesion and the quality of public service delivery. A special look at policies adapted to the demographic transition and climate change.

6 Session 3: Sustainable tourism: the issue of territorial cohesion between cities and rural areas.

7 Session 5: Open government: Bringing decision-making closer to citizens. Transparency and security policies. Resistance to foreign interference and disinformation.

8 Session 4: The role of artificial intelligence in territorial transformation and population evacuation.

9 Ignazio Portelli, cited above.

10 Milagros Tolon Jaime, Delegate of the Spanish Government in Castile-La Mancha (Spain).

11 Pilar María Bernabé García, State Representative in the Autonomous Community of Valencia (Spain).

12 "DANA": acronym for "Depresión Aislada en Niveles Altos" / high-level isolated depression.

13 Stefano Laporta, President of ISPRA (Higher Institute for Environmental Protection and Research), (Italy), "Energy crisis and environmental threats: e.g. the coordination of the Italian Prefects".

14 Julien Marion, Director of the Directorate-General for Civil Security and Crisis Management (France), "What place for solidarity in Europe around accelerating the consequences of climate change?" and Michèle Pappalardo, President of the Gustave Eiffel University Foundation, (France), "Tourism and the consequences of climate change in urban areas".

15 Milagros Tolon Jaime, cited above.

16 Arcadi España García, State Secretary, Ministry of Territorial Policy (Spain).

17 Julien Marion, cited above.

18 Ditto.

19 Arcadi España García, cited above.

20 Tania Solans Raluy, Mayor of Esplús (Spain).

21 Adriana Lastra Fernandez, Delegate of the Spanish Government in Asturias (Spain) and Tania Solans Raluy, cited above.

22 Miryam Alvarez Paez, cited above.

23 María Soledad Garmendia Beloqui, Delegate of the Spanish Government to the Basque Country (Spain).

24 Denis Mathen, Governor of Namur (Belgium), 'The integration and importance of the 'sustainability' dimension in the context of an international project with tourism benefits. The example of Namur'.

25 Tania Solans Raluy, cited above.

26 Alfonso Luis Rodriguez Badal, Delegate of the Spanish Government in the Balearic Islands (Spain).

27 Miryam Alvarez Paez, cited above.

28 Ruth Del Campo Bécares, Director-General for Data at the General Secretariat for Digitisation and Artificial Intelligence (Spain).

29 Spain hosted more than 1,700 Open Government Partnership (OGP) events in 2025. Through the collaboration of hundreds of public institutions, Spain strengthened its leadership as co-chair of the OGP Steering Committee and continued preparations for the OGP World Summit in Oct. 2025.

30 Carmen Cabanillas Serrano, Director General of Public Governance of the Ministry of Digital Transformation and Public Service (Spain).

31 Ditto.

32 This is part of the overall European open data context concerning a host of accessible and reusable data (e.g. in the housing sector, infrastructure, etc.) since 2020. V. Ruth Del Campo Bécares, cited above.

33 Carmen Cabanillas Serrano, cited above.

34 Ricardo Gabaldón, Mayor of Utiel (Spain).

35 Stefano Laporta, cited above.

36 Ina Adema, Commissioner of the King in the province of North Brabant (Netherlands), 'Balance between fires and floods: climate 'resilience' in a changing Dutch landscape?'

37 Ditto.

38 Ibid.

39 María Soledad Garmendia Beloqui, cited above.

- 40** Ina Adema, cited above.
- 41** Tania Solans Raluy, cited above.
- 42** Ana Muroz.
- 43** Michèle Pappalardo, cited above.
- 44** Denis Mathen, *supra*.
- 45** Michèle Pappalardo, cited above.
- 46** Pablo Torres Paniagua, Technical Secretary General of Housing and Urban Development (Spain).
- 47** María Soledad Garmendia Beloqui, cited above.
- 48** Sophie Lavaux, Senior Official of the Brussels Agglomeration (Belgium), 'Artificial intelligence in the evacuation of populations'.
- 49** Pilar María Bernabé García, cited above.
- 50** Ignazio Portelli and Saffet Aarikan Bedük, cited above.
- 51** Milagros Tolon Jaime, cited above.
- 52** Pilar María Bernabé García, cited above.
- 53** Ditto.
- 54** Stefano Laporta, cited above.
- 55** Ricardo Gabaldón, Mayor of Utiel (Spain).
- 56** Ditto.
- 57** Ina Adema, cited above.







Izmir, **Türkiye**

(May 2 - 4, 2024)

Management of Natural Disasters by State Territorial Representatives

Revealing growing vulnerabilities, natural disasters test states' capacity to anticipate, provide relief, and rebuild. Risk preparedness, the management of uncertainty, the coordination of multiple stakeholders, and the organization of the post-crisis phase emerge here as the conditions for effective territorial resilience. In the face of such situations, the state's territorial representatives play an essential role in steering, adapting, and ensuring continuity.



The objective of the European Days of State Territorial Representatives often consists of analyzing the concerns of its members through debates and exchanges of experience. Crisis management linked to natural disasters is one of them. The choice of Türkiye, regularly hit by major earthquakes, as host country for these 29th European Days, makes perfect sense. The earthquakes of February 6, 2023 near the cities of Gaziantep and Kahramanmaraş and of February 20, 2023 in the provinces of Hatay and Malatya caused more than 56,000 victims¹.

The common thread of the debates was to analyze, according to a comparative logic between the various countries represented, the way in which States can prepare to face natural disasters and when they occur, provide assistance and relief and then ensure “resilience” to the disaster-stricken territories².

During the opening protocol session, Mr. Saffet Arikan BEDÜK³ immediately underlined the “strategic position” of the State Territorial Representative (STR) in the management of natural disasters. The very fact of being a “territorialized field agent” can lead him to play an immediate “pivotal role” both to manage relief and then to “rebuild”⁴.

As a representative of the State at the territorial level, the STR is required to make decisions. In a crisis situation, this task appears particularly difficult for three essential reasons⁵. The first is to act quickly. The second, the STR has limited information, particularly at the beginning of the disaster. Finally, the STR must coordinate a large number of organizations. It is around this triptych that a problem appears: to what extent is the STR, due to its strategic position, able to play a coordinating role to manage the effects of natural disasters?

To answer this question, two risk experts spoke during the inaugural ceremony⁶ to provide an overall overview and four round tables were then organized. The first focused on “the coordination of relief operations and the organization of crisis management”⁷. The second, on “the joint action of STRs and other local, regional and national actors for assistance to disaster victims and mobilization of resources”⁸. A third was specifically focused on “helping the resumption of normal activities and the resilience of territories”⁹. Finally, a fourth particularly highlighted “crisis communication and relations with the Government”¹⁰.

In the light of the debates, two main axes were drawn. The first emphasizes risk management at the central level with the essential function of

planning (I). The second focuses the spotlight on the unique position of the STR in the management of natural disasters, a role of coordinator in the midst of chaos (II). It is of course necessary to apply the planned systems and existing protocols, but chaos sometimes requires improvisation.

RISK MANAGEMENT AT CENTRAL LEVEL

Fundamentally, there is a certain “unpredictability” of natural risks (earthquakes, storms, floods, episodes of hail, drought, forest fires, landslides, etc.) which also tend to multiply under the effect of climate change. This unpredictability is almost consubstantial with the notion of natural disasters. Regarding earthquakes, Orhan TATAR, Director General of the Earthquake Management Committee (AFAD), was able to highlight a “Where is next?” » evocative!

Preparation for crises linked to natural disasters is a function of the State

However, Olivier BORRAZ, researcher in social sciences, stressed that preparation for crises linked to natural disasters is “a function of the State” in the same way as education, housing, health... States have “the duty to protect their populations and crisis preparedness has become an essential element of this mission.” The speakers repeatedly mentioned the role of existing central organizations specifically in charge of these missions (Turkish AFAD created in 2009, Spanish Civil Defense¹¹, Albanian National Civil Protection Agency-NACP¹², etc.). These central organizations are provided for by various normative measures aimed at ensuring coordination of public risk management policies. They develop territorialized strategic planning documents, regularly updated, which are all responses to risk reduction (e.g. centralization of seismic signals, zoning, amplitudes and maps of earthquakes, centralized command posts, management of temporary housing, etc.). This planning (e.g. French CATNAT plan, Spanish regional plan, etc.) also provides for simulation exercises, protean monitoring and alert systems in line of course with the territories concerned. These organizations can also provide an essential interministerial coordination function (e.g. in Türkiye, no less than eight ministries are interested in the consequences of earthquakes).

Let us add that “the effects of natural disasters can be felt long after the disaster, “in terms of mental health, increased poverty, unemployment, stigmatization of foreigners and even political changes”¹³. These observations, from social sciences, imply that crises due to natural disasters, like many other situations, are prolonged. Their effects can indeed be “felt over a long period of time, in many different dimensions”. It appears that the implications for crisis managers in these circumstances are immense but can be summed up in a single word: “anticipation”¹⁴. During natural disasters, crisis managers must be able to anticipate developments in the situation and the impact of their decisions, and take the necessary measures to respond to these developments.



A political area in its own right

Crisis preparedness has thus “become a political area in its own right”¹⁵. This in no way means that States have done nothing in the past to avoid disasters or to react when they occurred. But since “the beginning of the 2000s”, natural disasters, like epidemics, industrial accidents, terrorist attacks, financial crises... have been defined “as crises threatening not only the population, the economy or vital infrastructure, but more generally the social fabric and public order.” Consequently, States have undertaken “to prepare for the emergence of crises, in order to react quickly and return as quickly as possible to the previous *status quo*”. In short, the unpredictability of the occurrence of certain natural risks should not be synonymous with unforeseen and even less with improvisation.

The destabilization of the established organization

However, it was highlighted that “an interesting and recurring feature of crisis response is that authorities often deviate from existing plans and protocols.” The authorities justify this “by insisting that the crisis situation does not correspond to pre-existing plans and that it requires adaptation and improvisation”. According to O. BORRAZ, “crisis management plans and simulation exercises tend to give a very ordered representation of a crisis, whereas, by definition, a crisis disrupts existing procedures and organizational boundaries”. In short, there is often a gap between crisis preparation and their concrete management on the ground. This part of “uncertainty” in the

application of pre-established plans on the ground is due to various factors which were clearly developed during the debates. The first concerns the management and understanding of information.

Information management

A central point lies in the management of information on the nature of the phenomenon, its impact, its evolution, etc. To reduce this uncertainty, according to O. BORRAZ, decision-makers need information and experts. In a crisis situation, information is often lacking at first, ... but quickly, the information becomes overwhelming. Multiple streams of information provide the decision maker with more than he or she can handle, especially today with social media. Uncertainty is then linked, not to a lack of information, but to an excess of information, difficult to interpret, prioritize, evaluate and use. Disagreements between experts are frequent and even predictable. Science “does not always speak a single truth to power, but multiple truths.” Moreover, understanding scientific information can be a challenge in itself. The decision maker must then manage these disagreements and controversies, which in themselves become another source of uncertainty. Another reason why decision-making in crisis situations is difficult and linked to the number of organizations to coordinate.

The management of multiple organizations

Indeed, in crisis situations, the coordination of the numerous organizations (administrations, businesses, NGOs, etc.) involved represents a challenge. Firstly, because these organizations are not always used to working with each other, sharing information or cooperating. They may have conflicting interests, rely on varied operating methods and different technologies, have divergent worldviews and values, and compete for resources. They may not know each other and have no pre-existing relationship, which makes their collaboration difficult according to O. BORRAZ.

Crisis management plans of course list the organizations that need to be involved, define their tasks and determine how they should work together. But plans don't always go as planned. Some organizations “collapse, others change methods, many improvise to adapt to the constraints created by the disaster.” Often, organizations “that were not part of the initial plan will emerge, either spontaneously among groups of citizens, or among entities that had



not been identified as emergency actors, but who decide to offer their experience and their resources. According to O. BORRAZ, it appears that “the difficulties in coordinating these multiple organizations can amplify the impact of the initial event and contribute to the crisis, because these organizations will each pursue different objectives and will not share information”.

In short, it appears that States prepare for crises, but when they arise, the application of the procedures and protocols provided for this purpose can be improved. Because what makes a crisis fundamentally “is not so much the triggering event, whether it is an earthquake, an industrial accident, an epidemic or a terrorist attack with all the initial uncertainty it entails, but the fact that it threatens multiple organizations in their ability to continue their activities”¹⁶.

It follows that to manage a crisis, we must understand “the factors that lead organizations to cooperate and adapt”. This can be done by providing additional resources or by softening rules and constraints. But it is essential “to understand the organizational nature of our society” to prepare for crises. As O. BORRAZ points out, we must recognize that “we live in very organized societies and that this in itself has become a source of vulnerability”.

In short, it appears that crisis managers “must understand that what makes a crisis lies not so much in the nature and impact of the triggering event as in its capacity to destabilize an existing order made up of multiple organizations, heterogeneous and often conflicting. It is therefore necessary to “shift the focus of attention from the event itself to the wide range of organizations involved and find ways to coordinate them”¹⁷.

 *It is essential to understand the organizational nature of our society*

In preparing for crises, crisis managers must recognize this multiplicity of organizations, both as a source of vulnerability and as a resource for an effective response, both in the short and long term. In this context, the pivotal role of the STR previously mentioned can facilitate the coordination work and even more broadly “fill in the gaps”¹⁸, the shortcomings and the deficiencies in planning.

Because normal decision-making capacity is affected in times of crisis, the STR, a field actor, can “improvise”¹⁹. Placed at the center of a multi-level and multi-actor network, the STR is able to assume a unique position in the management of natural disasters.

THE UNIQUE POSITION OF THE STR IN THE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL DISASTERS

In light of the debates, it appears that this position of the STR can be summarized in three points. First of all, the STR constitutes an essential relay between the central level and the field. Secondly, he is the facilitator and coordinator of a large number of actors placed at different levels to ensure the coordination of state operations and crisis management. Finally, he is a key player in reconstruction and the post-crisis era. Whatever the period envisaged (anticipation of natural risks upstream / management of chaos / return to normal downstream), crisis communication, consisting of responding to citizens’ need for information, constitutes a common thread.

The STR, nodal point between the central level and the field

This role of relay between the center and the periphery is of course situated at various times. The first step is to carry out upstream exercises aimed at anticipating the risks linked to the natural disaster. As mentioned previously, there is “a duty of the State to help”²⁰. Central States thus play an important role in planning natural risk and its management (e.g. Turkish TAMP-TARAP seismic risk reduction plans, French CATNAT plan, etc.). During the debates, various speakers emphasized the importance of these documents which reflect the need to anticipate the risks linked to natural disasters and their concrete translation on the ground (planning of humanitarian aid, etc.). These plans often develop “very precise local scenarios”²¹ which are the subject of “crisis anticipation exercises” sometimes on a very large scale as was the case in the county of Nograd in Hungary in 2018. This was then to carry out “defense exercises in the event of an earthquake”²² (meeting of the Civil Defense Committee, installation of field hospitals, coordination of relief, etc.).

These exercises make it possible to “identify certain deficiencies”²³ and above all to “learn lessons”²⁴ from them. Along the same lines, the Governor of the Province of Hainaut (Belgium) presented in great detail a plan for “preventing deficiencies in the orohydrographic network and flooding”²⁵. Proactive reflection carried out in the Province of Hainaut has enabled risk mapping, improvement of existing infrastructure and better awareness of actors, including in a cross-border dimension (establishment of citizen reserves in civil security, training of elected officials in cross-border territories, ...).

 *There is a duty of the State to help*

The importance of these plans was repeatedly emphasized during the debates for better preparing for the occurrence of “chaos”²⁶. What they all have in common is that they contain “early warning systems” for citizens, thus underlining the vital importance of “crisis communication”²⁷. For example, this is the case of the French “FR-Alert”²⁸ population alert and information system. Deployed nationally since June 2022, “FR-Alert” allows anyone with a mobile phone to be notified in real time of their presence in a danger zone in order to inform them of the behaviors to adopt to protect themselves. In the same sense, the “Operational Crisis Communication Process” (POCC) set up in the province of Antwerp²⁹ aims to quickly provide information, even when few factual elements are available, in order to avoid that information not verified will spread. Like other plans of the same type, it offers a structured and shared methodology for organizing information to the public. These plans all include variants adapted to the most frequent risks (e.g. Norwegian storm warning system³⁰, flood warning in the Province of Hainaut in Belgium³¹ and Germany³², earthquakes in Albania, forest fires in Spain ...). There is a compelling need to disseminate and infuse “a culture of risk” among populations. This information passes through the STR channel: “know how to sort information”, “demonstrate pedagogy towards citizens to explain things and specify what should be done and not done” through a whole series of media (press, social networks, etc.).

The occurrence of a natural disaster can plunge entire territories into “chaos”. During the debates, large-scale disasters were explained in great detail (Kahramanmaraş earthquakes of February 2023

in Türkiye³³, the Korça region on June 1, 2019 in Albania³⁴, violent floods in the Cantabria region in Spain in January 2019³⁵, massive floods in Pas-de-Calais in France during the winter of 2023-2024³⁶, “storm of the century” in Germany and France in 1999³⁷, etc.). These disasters, often heavy in victims and destruction, call for massive relief operations and more broadly “an organization of crisis management”. This requires joint action by STRs and other local, regional and national actors to assist disaster victims and mobilize resources.

The STR, animator and coordinator of relief operations and crisis management

At the heart of the tragedy resulting from a natural disaster and “chaos”, the STR often finds itself legally on the front line to act, lead and coordinate a public and private “multi-actor network”. It is at the heart of an “integrated system”³⁸ sometimes including European actors (European Task Forces from the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, NGOs³⁹, etc.) but also of course national actors (from defense and civil protection, soldiers, firefighters, health teams, water agencies, veterinarians, public works contractors, etc.). Among these actors, academics and scientific experts (present in particular in the aforementioned central organizations, e.g. Turkish AFAD) of course play a crucial role and the STR must be able to “support” them thanks to its information from the ground. This involves informing the central level about the evolution of the situation, making up for shortcomings in the initial plans, preparing plans for the next day, etc.

As part of this multi-actor network, the work and partnership with local authorities were highlighted (e.g. flood management in France and Belgium, etc.). *Ad hoc* structures are operated such as the French “Departmental Operational Center” (COD) which brings together all security and emergency forces, as well as state services and territorial actors. Crisis management tool available to the STR, decisions are made on the basis of evolving mapping, in support of the decision and crisis management plans which provide a basis for planning, which circumstances lead to adapt. Finer territorial structures can also be implemented closer to the ground (e.g. operational command post - PCO set up at Vichy town hall during a very intense hail episode in June 2022⁴⁰, appointment of “700 STR auxiliary” in Türkiye during the earthquakes of 2023...).



A “crisis management process” methodology appears (e.g. “IBOBBO” methodology in the province of Antwerp⁴¹) which contributes to common and shared knowledge of the situation by emphasizing the following stages: collection of information, judgment, decision making, command and monitoring⁴². This risk management of course includes an important communication component.

“ A ‘crisis management process’ methodology

At the heart of the chaos, the STR is the pivot for coordinating relief operations. Crisis management can sometimes be incredibly intense, commensurate with the natural disaster itself. The Turkish speaker in round table n^o43, recounting their personal experiences during the Kahramanmaraş earthquakes of February 6, 2023, were able to draw up a long list of emergency actions undertaken (search for survivors, installation of “field hospitals”, evacuation of victims and rubble, coordination of gigantic works caused by massive destruction, delivery of medical aid and food, prevention of pandemics, division of disaster areas into “subdistricts”, disinfection of premises, problems of water pipes and more broadly the management of drinking water, management of stray animals, waste management, etc.). Very quickly, the victims must be rehoused (installation of “tent cities” or “container cities”, management of “right holders” to housing, etc.). In this chaos, psychosocial support in all its dimensions (psychological, spiritual, etc.) is also quickly put in place. This support also involves the establishment of social activities (management of orphans, idle people, installation of libraries, cafeterias, playgrounds, places of conviviality, sports groups, etc.) and educational (continuation of the schooling of children, installation of student hostels, etc.)⁴⁴.

In addition to this large-scale earthquake in Türkiye, other examples of natural disasters were provided during the debates (e.g. massive floods in Pas-de-Calais in 2023-2024⁴⁵, episode of intense hail in Vichy in 2022⁴⁶...). It still appears that the STR must ensure “operational management” of the immediate consequences of the natural disaster (e.g. in Pas-de-Calais, implementation of task forces brought together by each of the district sub-prefects in the form operational committees to deal as closely as possible on the ground with all emerging issues - pumping, insurance, rehousing, etc. - and identify, plan and coordinate extreme emergency work on watercourses).

Crisis management calls, as previously mentioned, for controlled communication to inform the public (fight against “fake news”, rumors, etc.) and firstly the victims themselves (e.g. telephone cell to support individuals flooded in Pas-de-Calais, establishment of facilitating “one-stop shops”, “Vichy solidarity” etc.).

Once the peak of the crisis, the *momentum*, has passed, once operational management of the immediate consequences of the natural disaster has been ensured, once the media has focused on other events, once the emergency services have been partially demobilized or engaged for other emergencies, a more or less long period begins to support disaster victims and territories in the post-crisis period and in the return to a form of normality. It is then necessary to assess the damage, assist residents, help businesses and farmers to resume their activity and compensate for losses, restart essential networks or even initiate studies with a view to repairing destroyed infrastructure. This leads to mobilizing other resources and other skills. The STR is also a post-crisis manager.

The STR, an essential player in reconstruction and the post-crisis

Support for the resumption of normal activities and “territorial resilience”⁴⁷ is an integral part of the STRs’ missions. These actions are not all the responsibility of the State, even in a country where the State is very present. Intense coordination and mobilization action is then necessary to activate all actors (e.g. insurers, etc.) and prevent everyone from sticking to the implementation of sometimes lengthy procedures while residents expect rapid responses, and, in the distressed situation they are experiencing, cannot always understand the deadlines imposed on them. It is also necessary to communicate very regularly on the actions undertaken to inform potential beneficiaries of the measures put in place but also to prevent the inevitable controversies over the inaction of “public authorities”, a very broad concept which includes both the State but also all local actors, in particular local authorities. Relaying government actions and working closely with elected officials and civil society, the STR naturally has “an essential role”⁴⁸.

It is the time for recognition of the exceptional nature of the natural event in the form of the implementation of the natural disaster procedure (e.g. French CATNAT). This procedure, initiated by the municipalities, is the subject of an instruction at the Prefecture before transmission to the Ministry. An interministerial commission decides on the

attribution (or not) of this recognition, essential for compensation.

This time is also marked by work to coordinate major reconstruction work (e.g. housing in Türkiye meeting seismic standards, certain damaged monuments such as in Vichy with an exceptional heritage dimension, roads, related works of art related with communities, etc.) and rehousing actions (e.g. long-term “mobile home” in Pas-de-Calais, acquisitions of damaged homes in France via the “Barnier fund” etc.).

 *Intense coordination and mobilization action*

It is sometimes appropriate to develop a real “resilience and prevention plan with the implementation of structuring work”⁴⁹. For example, following the floods in Pas-de-Calais, there was the deployment of a “Departmental Monitoring Committee” with the objective of “coordinating the actions developed at the basin level” and providing responses to all the problems caused by flooding. Large-scale works may sometimes be necessary (e.g. dikes in Pas-de-Calais, new urbanization in Albania following the 2019 earthquake, modeling of equipment and structures in Hainaut in Belgium following floods, works of reforestation in Germany after the storm of 1999...).

The State must also “facilitate” the rehabilitation of production tools to enable the relaunch of economic action and “support” artisans, traders and farmers in resuming activity. “Resilience plans” also often include elements to “change governance” (e.g. prevention and management of floods in Pas-de-Calais, establishment of a “Belgian Citizen Reserve”, strengthening of cooperation cross-border relationship in terms of flooding between Belgium and France⁵⁰, in terms of drought and water management between Germany and France⁵¹, etc.).



To conclude, and in the light of very dense debates, it appears in many respects that the STRs are a “generalist” of risk and in particular of natural risk due to its territorial anchoring.

Their position gives them a certain capacity to prevent natural risk by preparing for it but also to manage it on a decision-making level when the natural disaster occurs and anticipate the evolution of the situation as close as possible to populations and territories, which constitutes their undeniable added value.





NOTES

1 Hüseyin Kürşat KIRBIYIK, Governor, Deputy Minister of Health (Türkiye).

2 It should be noted that on a global scale, under the aegis of the United Nations, the “Sendai framework” was adopted which covers the period 2015-2030 for disaster risk reduction. At the EU level, the European Commission decided on February 8, 2023 a Recommendation (C(2023) 400 final) and a Communication (COM(2023) 61 final) relating to “the Union’s objectives in terms of disaster resilience”.

3 President of the EASTR, former Governor, President of the Turkish Association of Governors (Türkiye).

4 Süleyman ELBAN, Governor of Izmir (Türkiye).

5 Olivier BORRAZ, Director of research at the CNRS (National Center for Scientific Research), founder of CrisisLab, Center for Sociology of Organizations of Sciences Po (France).

6 Prof. Dr. Orhan TATAR, Director General of the Earthquake Management Committee-AFAD (Türkiye) and Olivier BORRAZ, Director of research at the CNRS (France).

7 Moderator: Associated prof. Selim ÇAPAR, Governor and head of the Research and Study Center of the Ministry of the Interior (Türkiye).

8 Moderator: Laura LEGA, Prefect, head of the civil liberties and immigration department (Italy).

9 Moderator: Laurent PREVOST, Prefect, former Director General of Civil Security and Risk Management, Ministry of the Interior (France).

10 Moderator: Anne AZAM-PRADEILLES, Honorary civil administrator, international expert in public administration reform (France).

11 Eugenia GOMEZ DE DIEGO, Government Delegate to the Region of Cantabria, “Governance of natural disaster management in Spain”.

12 Nertil JOLE, prefect of the Korça region (Albania).

13 Olivier BORRAZ.

14 Idem.

15 Ibid.

16 Olivier BORRAZ: “An earthquake in the middle of the desert may be a natural event, but it is certainly not a disaster. What makes a disaster is the impact of the initial phenomenon on the social fabric, infrastructure, cities, the economy, the health of the population, public order”.

17 Idem.

18 Mustafa MASATLI, Governor of the Province of Hatay (Türkiye).

19 Dr. Osman VAROL, Governor of the Province of Adiyaman (Türkiye).

20 Okay MEMİŞ, Governor (Türkiye).

21 Sándor SZABÓ, Government Commissioner of Nógrád County (Hungary).

22 Idem.

23 Ibid.

24 Renato FRANCESCHELLI, Head of the Civil Protection Department (Italy).

25 Tommy LECLERCQ, Governor of the Province of Hainaut (Belgium).

26 Ex. by Laura LEGA, Prefect (Italy), aforementioned.

27 This aspect was the subject of a specific round table to highlight its crucial nature. (Round table 4 “Crisis communication and relations with the Government”, Moderator: Anne AZAM-PRADEILLES).

28 Pascale TRIMBACH, prefect of Allier (France), “Hail episode in Vichy, a city listed as a world heritage site: ecological and economic consequences”.

29 Cathy BERX, Governor of the Province of Antwerp (Belgium), “Crisis communication and relations with the government”.

30 Tom Cato KARLSEN, Governor of Nordland County (Norway), “Crisis communication in the Arctic”.

31 Tommy LECLERCQ, Governor of the Province of Hainaut (Belgium).

32 Frank SCHERER, Landrat of the district Ortenaukreis (Germany).

33 Hüseyin Kürşat KIRBIYIK, Governor, Deputy Minister of Health (Türkiye).

34 Nertil JOLE, prefect of the Korça region (Albania).

35 Eugenia GOMEZ DE DIEGO, Government Delegate to the Region of Cantabria (Spain).

36 Jacques BILLANT, Prefect of the Pas-de-Calais department (France), “Floods in Pas-de-Calais”.

37 Frank SCHERER, Landrat of the district Ortenaukreis (Germany).

38 Laura LEGA aforementioned.

39 Mustafa MASATLI, Governor of Hatay province (Türkiye).

40 Pascale TRIMBACH, prefect of Allier (France).

41 This method has now become a standard in Belgium in terms of decision-making procedure during a crisis situation.

42 Cathy BERX, Governor of the Province of Antwerp (Belgium).

43 Moderator: Associate Prof. Selim ÇAPAR, Research and Study Center of the Ministry of the Interior (Türkiye); Okay MEMİŞ, Governor (Türkiye) “General effects of earthquakes and situation analysis”; Mustafa MASATLI, Governor of Hatay province (Türkiye), “Infrastructure, environment and decluttering”; Dr. Osman VAROL, Governor of Adiyaman Province (Türkiye) “Search and rescue, temporary shelter and debris removal services”.

44 Fatma Turhan KESER, Governor of Perşembe District (Türkiye), “Psychosocial support services for earthquake victims”.

45 Jacques BILLANT, Prefect of the Pas-de-Calais department (France).

46 Pascale TRIMBACH, prefect of Allier (France).

47 Laurent PREVOST, Prefect (France).

48 Idem.

49 Jacques BILLANT, Prefect of the Pas-de-Calais department (France).

50 Tommy LECLERCQ, Governor of the Province of Hainaut (Belgium).

51 Frank SCHERER, Landrat of the Ortenaukreis district (Germany).







Malmö, **Sweden**

(April 13 - 15, 2023)

The consequences of the war in Ukraine – how does it affect our countries?

Revealing Europe's vulnerabilities, the war in Ukraine also emerged as an accelerator of strategic realignment. In spring 2023, four major issues appeared to be taking shape: the strength of Western support, the territorial management of refugee reception, the economic and energy-related effects of the conflict, and the emergence of new responses in the areas of defense, resilience, and sovereignty. Implicitly, one idea stood out: in the face of a prolonged crisis, the state's territorial representatives play an essential role in adaptation, coordination, and stability.



The objective of the European Days of State Territorial Representatives often consists of analyzing the concerns of its members. In the tense international context linked to the war in Ukraine¹, Sweden and neighboring Finland are concerned “primarily by the strategic question of their integration within NATO”². It is this deep motivation which explains the choice of the working theme of these XXVIIIth European Days relating to “the consequences of the war in Ukraine and its impacts on the different member countries of the EASTR”. In this context, the city of Malmö and its “tradition of welcoming the most diverse refugees since the Second World War”³ is emblematic. It also appears that the vast majority of refugees from Ukraine who came to Sweden are in Skåne⁴.



An overview of the international situation

Innovatively, these European Days were organized in the form of four interactive working groups and held concomitantly. Each working group had a dedicated working theme. Working group “A” focused on “the perception of conflict and risks at the local level” (in the media, at the level of the political class and elections, in public opinion, etc.)⁵. Group “B” for its part analyzed “the impact on national defense policies” (the question of NATO, new direct threats and specific challenges for countries with directly threatened borders, preparation of civilians to new military threats...) ⁶. Working group “C” focused on “the impact on economic and social policies” (supply of energy resources and agricultural products, tourism policy and freedom of international movement, internal social climate, etc.)⁷. And finally, working group “D” focused on “the reception of Ukrainian refugees” (accommodation, right to work, schooling, health, return to Ukraine, etc.)⁸. The work of these working groups was then presented collectively during a plenary session in the form of four summaries written by rapporteurs within each working group⁹. This debate process made it possible to significantly expand the list of discussed themes.

Firstly, two recognized experts¹⁰ gave during the plenary session an overview of the international situation linked to this high-intensity war in order to frame the reflection of the members present.

According to Yves Doutriaux, State Councilor, professor of geopolitics at Paris-Dauphine University and former French Ambassador to the OSCE in Vienna (from 2003 to 2006), the

“unprovoked invasion” of Feb. 24, 2022 took place “in a long-standing context of growing tensions between Ukraine and Russia and between Russia and Western countries”. For several years, relations have been increasingly tense between Russia and Ukraine: the “orange” revolution of 2004 which, for Moscow, was secretly initiated by Westerners who would seek to oust Russia from its sphere of influence; “Maidan revolution” in the fall of 2013 caused by the refusal of President Yanukovich, under pressure from Russia, to sign an association agreement with the EU; Russia seizes Crimea... In this context, the EU and the United States adopt political (exclusion of Russia from the G8) and economic sanctions against Russia, which takes economic “countermeasures” against the EU. Russia supports a secessionist movement in Donbass. France and Germany provide aid for the “Minsk agreements” of February 2015 providing for a ceasefire in the Donbass, prisoner exchanges, the withdrawal of heavy weapons, a special status for the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, elections under international control, Ukraine’s control of its border with Russia... But the discussions did not make it possible to implement these agreements.

More generally, we have witnessed a cooling of relations between Russia and the West in recent years as a result of several phenomena (NATO action against Serbia in Kosovo in 1999 was contested by Russia – and China – as contrary to international law; Russian leaders saw in the “color revolutions” movements supported by the West to challenge Russia’s presence in its “near environment”; for V. Putin, NATO enlargement is “a serious provocation lowering the level of mutual trust”)¹¹. In 2014, the annexation of Crimea significantly deteriorated Western relations with Russia. On February 23, 2022, V. Putin noted a “fundamental threat to the security of Russia constituted by the enlargement of NATO towards the East and the rapprochement of its military infrastructure towards the Russian borders”¹².

The time has now come for the “glaciation of relations”¹³ between the EU, the United States and Russia due to political sanctions (exclusion of Russia from the Council of Europe, the Human Rights Council of the UN...), economic sanctions (10 sets of EU sanctions including general sanctions and individual sanctions for oligarchs, people and entities seen as responsible for the invasion). Russia’s GDP contracted by 4.5% in 2022 according to the World Bank, a smaller decline than expected. For its part, the EU helps Ukraine in various ways (reception of displaced persons with a favorable temporary protection status; economic and humanitarian aid; EU financing

of supplies, including lethal ones, intended for the Ukrainian armed forces, “European facility for peace”; candidate status granted to Ukraine by the EC of June 23, 2022, a political gesture but the negotiation will be long, creation of a “European political community”).

Dr. Katarina Engberg, member of the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, spoke about the potential “threats and opportunities” of the Ukrainian conflict.

The maintenance of Western solidarity

A very detailed portrait of the “democratic transformation of Europe” (Portugal, Greece, Spain, etc.) in just a few decades has been put into perspective with the dismantling of the Soviet Union and a certain weakening of Russia. A few unprecedented decades of prosperity and peace since the end of the 1980s have brought the violence of the Ukrainian conflict to the surface. Ms. Engberg, however, places the latter in the “continuity of democratic transitions” of the 1970s in Europe and sees it as an opportunity to mark the transition from a “European Union from 27 to 35”. Many questions remain unanswered as it stands (Eastern countries under influence appearing as “buffer zones” ...) and several scenarios are raised regarding the outcome of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia presented as “the last unreformed empire in Europe”¹⁴. The “resilience of Ukraine” surprised Russia, which had to withdraw its troops in May and then between August and November 2022 from part of the territories. The Ukrainian president wants to restore the integrity of the 1991 borders, including Donbass and the Crimea. Putin’s evolving war aim remains unclear. Originally, it was about a regime change in Kyiv, then annexing four oblasts. Today it is a war against the West.

According to Y. Doutriaux, four scenarios can emerge. The first of these lies in a war which continues to lead to “a frozen conflict” like many conflicts in the world. Russia has a large population and, despite sanctions, resources which remain significant, with the complicity of North Korea, Iran and, more cautiously, China. For its part, Ukraine, with Western help, remains determined to take the offensive. The 2nd scenario results from an “extension of the conflict” by Russia against NATO countries by using the panoply of hybrid war. But NATO countries have equipped themselves with

cyber defense means. The EU has implemented a policy aimed at doing without Russia for its energy supply while the price of gas has fallen to its 2021 level. A third scenario involves a “collapse of the Putin regime”. It remains that the pretenders for his succession would be just as nationalist, if not more so. There is relative apathy among the population, with opponents having been muzzled or gone abroad. Finally, we can ultimately envisage a “peace agreement” accompanied by long-term guarantees for the security of Ukraine and Russia.

Implicitly, of course, there is also the “maintenance of Western solidarity” over time, both financial (EU support of around €50 billion, US support, etc.), economic (consequences on the agricultural and energy markets, rising inflation...), military and societal (reception of refugees, rebuilding a “civil defense” capacity, EU directive on the “resilience of critical entities...”) ¹⁵. The Ukrainian conflict obviously has major repercussions on the global context. Western countries are “on a war footing”¹⁶. China is becoming a leading global player, and agrees with Russia that the West has entered into decline for various reasons.

From this tense international situation with its numerous uncertainties, a problem emerges: to what extent does the war in Ukraine impact our countries, but also to what extent can it also bring opportunities that remain to be identified? The STRs, acting on the ground, have of course been mobilized in various ways in this context.

IMPACTS OF THE UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

The human and material consequences of this conflict are very serious. In addition to the tens of thousands of direct victims of the conflict, there are more than 7 million Ukrainian refugees who have been welcomed in Europe.

Reception of refugees, between efficiency and improvisation

This welcome was mainly provided by Poland. Italy welcomed 170,000 Ukrainian refugees, France, around 115,000, and more than 6,000 were welcomed in the canton of Vaud in Switzerland alone, which has 800,000 inhabitants. Nearly 9 out of 10 Europeans are in favor of welcoming Ukrainian refugees¹⁷.

Within the EU, European Directive 55 of July 20, 2001 “relating to temporary protection in the event of a massive influx of displaced persons”¹⁸



was implemented for the first time. It establishes a system to deal with a massive influx into the EU of foreign nationals who cannot return to their country of origin, particularly due to war. It puts in place “immediate and temporary protection for these displaced people” and ensures a balance between the efforts made by EU member states to welcome these people. However, it does not provide for the compulsory distribution of asylum seekers among member States.

 *A strong solidarity on all fronts*

As a preliminary to the work of group “D”¹⁹, the support of FRONTEX to Member States was highlighted, particularly in terms of consolidated information on flows. The deployment of the European corps in Romania was also explained.

On the ground, the role of prefects in welcoming refugees was central and determining in liaison with local authorities and particularly municipalities (accommodation, creation of reception centers with state assistance, financial aid, etc.). In Switzerland, all Ukrainians were welcomed “without quotas”, the organizations were set up, “S” permits were issued...

In practice, the reception of refugees was also marked by an abundance of private voluntary initiatives (citizens, associations, private homes, etc.) demonstrating a strong solidarity on all fronts (in terms of accommodation, educational and professional integration...). The work of group “D” attests to this. For the moment, there appears to be unwavering support on the public opinion front in Europe (see summary of group “A”) on the question of welcoming Ukrainian refugees.

However, points of tension appear, particularly at the local level. The “temporary protection” (health, school, work, etc.) offered to “displaced persons” (Directive 2001/55/EC cited above) allows Ukrainian refugees to obtain a difference in treatment which results in the creation of “two-speed refugees” sometimes perceived as discrimination by refugees of other nationalities. For example, in Switzerland, the free public transport once offered to Ukrainian refugees was a source of intense controversy. Tensions also appeared on the question of housing in the context of a market which is already very tense. Tensions are also reported in the population also linked to the intense solicitation of “the militia” (civil protection service) on the Ukrainian question.

A whole series of questions linked to duration are beginning to arise (mobility of Ukrainians themselves, question of minors, secondary and higher education, etc.).

Economic and energy impacts / Issues of public opinions

The risk of public fatigue over time is real (see summary of working group “A”²⁰). Since this conflict has economic and energy consequences in Europe, directly affecting the purchasing power of European citizens in their daily lives. We saw a sharp increase in the prices of energy even before the invasion and of raw materials (cereals, fertilizers, etc.), thus hitting economies that were barely emerging from the Covid crisis. The repercussions of the conflict in Ukraine on the agricultural market in Europe and around the world are significant. The discussions highlighted the risks linked to differences in requirements between Ukraine and European producers, as well as the influence of the collection of customs taxes on the grain market²¹.

However, the economic and financial sanctions policies set against Russia by the EU are popular. Indeed, nearly 8 out of 10 Europeans surveyed support these sanctions, in Poland, Spain, Ireland, Sweden and Germany. In France, support is slightly more timid since only 7 out of 10 French people support these sanctions. Also, it is interesting to note that the degree of empathy towards Ukraine appears aligned with diplomatic activism and the intensity of support for the Ukrainian cause from the governments of each country.

 *Russia has overestimated its capacity to cause harm*

The arms deliveries were well received by Europeans with approval rates of around 80% for Polish and Swedish people. A little less in France and Germany, with an adherence rate of 50 to 60%, but this position can also be explained by the fact that these two countries are geographically far from Russia and therefore feel less in danger. There has been no erosion of support for the Ukrainians as dreamed of by the pro-Russian cronies who predicted a collapse of the West with the cessation of Russian gas and oil exports. There were no shortages, no social anger, no change in public opinion. Russia has overestimated its capacity to cause harm. Thus, the Russian offensive turns out

to be a failure in the battle of public opinion²². The summary of working group “A” clearly mentions this aspect. We can also note from the latter’s work that the conflict was the subject of very intense media coverage in all of our countries. It aroused strong “emotion” throughout Europe (numerous demonstrations of solidarity, humanitarian enthusiasm, etc.) with the democratic question underlying it.

Nevertheless, at this stage, a change in opinion remains possible, it could come from a certain “fatigue” with regard to a conflict which is ongoing over time and fuels inflation (in particular of energy)²³. Furthermore, from one country to another, questions arise in public opinion and in the media (the “fear of the future”, the problem of gas stocks, the risks of power cuts, the question of the nature of weapons provided to Ukraine so as not to “provoke Russia too much” present in almost all countries, perception of nuclear risk, problem of Swiss neutrality in connection with the re-export of weapons to Ukraine, question of Russian assets in Swiss banks, resurgence of the question of “atomic shelters” in Switzerland, existence of a Russophile trend in France, political risk with the rise of populism, etc.). A decline in media coverage of the Ukrainian conflict has already been noted, including on social networks.

Geopolitical impact

The presentations and summary of working group “B”²⁴ clearly exposed the problem of “critical borders” in Europe with Russia. These are areas of high geopolitical risk. More precisely, six borders were explained (the 1,300 km long Russian-Finnish border; the Baltic countries; the Suwalki corridor connecting the Kaliningrad oblast; the Gotland islands; the Ukrainian border; Moldova and Transnistria).

In this context, many issues were the subject of very precise presentations (question of patrols, fences, the demilitarized islands of Åland, the problem of the security of Stockholm, the challenges for Poland, the 18th military power in the world, the situation in Lithuania, Belarus, etc.).

In the end, it obviously appears that the context carries significant risks. However, opportunities exist.

SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES

The Ukrainian conflict has the seeds of many developments. It enabled a strengthening of NATO (see summary of working group “B”) in the process of being enlarged to include Sweden and Finland. But the war also has an effect on the theme of “strategic autonomy” in the sense of strengthening European defense. The EU adopted a “strategic compass” in March 2022 and finances lethal weapons intended for Ukraine and Ukrainian military training through the “Peacebuilding Facility”. EU member States are supplying increasingly “offensive” weapons (tanks, etc.). The “compass”, seeking to provide a response to strategic challenges, recommends a coordinated reaction to cyber-attacks, preventive measures and sanctions against their perpetrators. The Union must also fight against information manipulation and interference activities carried out from abroad, including Russia as part of its hybrid war (preparing populations for new threats, etc.). Risks and threats in space are also taken into account. This conflict can be “an opportunity for Europe to wake up geopolitically”²⁵. Most of the countries present at these European Days (Germany, France, Romania, etc.) are experiencing sharp increases in their military budgets, breaking with the sluggishness that marked previous decades (Cf. summary of working group “B”).

 *Fight against information manipulation and interference activities*

The concluding remarks of this working group highlight the importance given to public information in the current context. Emphasis is also placed on the issues of “preparation and civil defense” and on the need to “create networks between democratic European countries” in a “spirit of defense” around “shared values”.

Resilience

It was also mentioned, more specifically in working group “C”, that this episode of the war in Ukraine could serve as a springboard for profound developments in our countries in terms of energy and economics²⁶.

The 12 goals of the “Economic and Social Resilience Plan” set by France (tariff shield, France Relance



program, etc.), as well as the positive results observed, were analyzed. During the discussions, the France 2030 program was mentioned, with the objective of strengthening sovereignty by promoting the relocation of industrial production (agricultural, food sovereignty, etc.). More generally, it is possible to take advantage of the situation to develop more sustainable pragmatic solutions in terms of food production, for example.

In terms of energy policy, the war in Ukraine resulted in an improvement in coordination (gas imports, the method of calculating the price of electricity, relaunch of nuclear power, etc.)²⁷. It also made it possible to move away from a certain “naiveté” in this area marked by dependence on third countries and by an overall lack of preparation regarding the risks of energy or other shortages.

We can here mention the role of the Swiss STR in the implementation of “business continuity plans” (PCA in French) aimed at formalizing the functioning of each institution responsible for public tasks in order to guarantee essential services in the event of a shortage of energy resources. The same applies to the establishment of “emergency meeting points” which allow the population to quickly access the various emergency services in the event of a breakdown in usual means of communication.



These 28th European Days of State Territorial Representatives were the subject of intense “informed discussions”²⁸. Following the Russian offensive in Ukraine in Feb. 2022, it appears that many threats have arisen in our societies. The political, economic, energy and even societal consequences are immense. However, past the state of astonishment and like Ukrainian resilience itself, our societies are able to seize opportunities and thereby demonstrate a certain capacity for adaptation.



NOTES

1 Anneli Hulthén, Governor of Skåne county (Sweden).

2 Pierre-Etienne Bisch, Secretary General of the EASTR.

3 Katrin Stjernfeldt Jammeh, Mayor of Malmö (Sweden).

4 Anna Jähnke, Vice-governor and president of the regional development committee (Sweden).

5 President: Florence Siegrist, Prefect, Riviera-Pays-d'Enhaut (Switzerland).

6 President: Anne Azam-Pradeilles, honorary civil administrator, international expert in public administration reform (France).

7 President: Gérard Gavory, Prefect of Vendée (France).

8 President: Denis Mathen, Governor of Namur province (Belgium).

9 Rapp. of group "A": Eric Freysselinard, Prefect, Director of the Institute of Advanced Studies of the Ministry of the Interior (France). Rapp. of group "B": Marko Pukkinen, Director general, Regional State Administrative Agency for Western and Inner Finland (Finland); Rapp. of group "C": Roland Berdoz, Prefect of district Riviera-Pays-d'Enhaut, Canton of Vaud (Switzerland); Rapp. of group "D": Fabrice Leggeri, High official (France).

10 Dr. Katarina Engberg, senior advisor at the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies and former director of Swedish government offices at the Ministry of Defense and then the Prime Minister's Office. Yves Doutriaux, State Councilor, lecturer in public law and public management at the Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University, and professor of geopolitics at the Paris-Dauphine University. He was also French Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Vienna (2003 to 2006).

11 Mentioned by Y. Doutriaux.

12 Idem.

13 Dr. Katarina Engberg.

14 Y. Doutriaux

15 Dr. Katarina Engberg.

16 Idem.

17 Report of the group "A": Eric Freysselinard.

18 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 relating to minimum standards for the granting of temporary protection in the event of a massive influx of displaced persons and to measures tending to ensure a balance between the efforts made by member States to welcome these people and bear the consequences of this reception, L 212/12, JOCE of 7.8.2001.

19 Report of the group "D": Fabrice Leggeri.

20 Report of the group "A": Eric Freysselinard.

21 Report of the group "C": Roland Berdoz.

22 Report of the group "A": Eric Freysselinard.

23 Idem.

24 Report of the group "B": Marko Pukkinen.

25 Dr. Katarina Engberg.

26 Report of the group "C": Roland Berdoz.

27 Yves Doutriaux.

28 Ola Melin, Deputy County Governor of Skåne (Sweden), moderator of the XXVIIIth European Days.





Florence, Italy

(October 28 - 30, 2021)

The role of STRs in the security of cities of art and in the heritage protection

The role of STRs in the Covid-19 crisis management

Whether it is a matter of preserving a shared heritage or responding to a major crisis, the state's territorial representatives play an essential role in structuring, adapting, and maintaining public trust. While the protection of heritage highlights imperatives of security, coordination, arbitration, and cohesion, the Covid-19 crisis—through its scale and suddenness—brought to light the need for a state capable of acting swiftly, maintaining public continuity, and reconciling collective protection with individual freedoms.



As often, the objective of the European Days is to follow societal evolutions¹ and through them, the evolution of the role of the State Territorial Representatives (STR) in the manner of an “agora”, that is to say “a place for dialogue without prejudice”². It is about appreciating the leeway enjoyed by the STRs within our complex and “fragmented”³ societies. More precisely, how do they play their role of “relay between the center and the periphery”⁴ in order to work for social cohesion?

Two themes were chosen for these 27th Days. The first relates to “the safety of art cities and the protection of heritage”, a subject not appearing at first glance on the menu of sovereign powers. However, in the light of the very dense exchanges, we note a transversal mobilization of the European public authorities on this theme. And a second theme, directly linked to world news, addressing the “role of STRs in the management of the Covid-19 crisis” studied more specifically from the angle of the delicate question of reconciling freedoms with health security. To deal with these two themes, two sessions were necessary to understand the very variable leeway managed by the STRs.

The role of the STRs in the security of cities of art and in the heritage protection

Two fundamental points were highlighted. First of all, the successive presentations made it possible to paint a portrait of the variety of challenges to be taken up and of the multiple issues linked to heritage issues. It then appears that the role of the STR in this ecosystem of cultural and natural heritage can be qualified as “structuring”.

CHALLENGES AND ISSUES OF HERITAGE PROTECTION

The debates clearly highlighted the fact that “heritage” constitutes both a heritage and a fundamental element of our “individual and collective” memory⁵. Heritage represents “a collective representative value of national identity”⁶. Heritage “appears more and more as a factor of economic development, social cohesion and the

maintenance of a territorial balance”⁷. It is also a key element of sustainable development⁸ and has a strong “social inclusion” issue⁹. It is a source of identity and cohesion¹⁰. More specifically, the preservation and “enjoyment” of heritage sites present a “social dimension” understood as an element of local “pride”¹¹.

A collective representative value of national identity

The protection of heritage is first and foremost a legal concept¹². On the normative level, this is reflected in the registration of many sites on “specific lists” through very diverse “labeling” policies which have tended to increase in recent years (“Small Cities of Tomorrow” in France, etc.).

The notion of heritage is of course very present on the international scene¹³, in particular through UNESCO’s cultural conventions. These are varied “powerful normative tools”¹⁴ intended to support States in their choices and to promote peace, culture, intercultural dialogue or even unite around humanist values. The “culture / sustainable development” dialectic appears to be a force for transforming our societies.

Very rich comments have been developed on the “memorial heritage”. The latter presents itself as “the spearhead of the national spirit” but it also appears as a “vector of cooperation for the future” on the international scene (e.g. the Douaumont Ossuary). It has also been shown a certain “reluctance”¹⁵ to register heritages and sites linked to a conflict (with the exception of Auschwitz and Hiroshima).

To deepen the work, it was necessary to better understand the very notion of “security of heritage”. The great “polysemy” of this term has thus been demonstrated¹⁶. Since the 1970s, this concept of security has tended to slide towards the concepts of “safeguard”, “conservation” and “prevention” (preserving the integrity of the property in the face of natural disasters; securing “cities of art” in the face of threats of fires, terrorism, etc.).

THE “STRUCTURING” ROLE OF THE PREFECT IN HERITAGE MATTERS

STRs are “players and partners” in heritage management¹⁷, primarily in the field of safety. They constantly monitor the reception conditions for the public, with particular vigilance on sites hosting large flows in restricted spaces. This vigilance is reinforced in case of a particular threat, of a terrorist nature, or in case of a ceremony or demonstration on the public highway. They should take a leading place to set up a real plan for the coordination of initiatives in terms of maintaining public order: management of visitor flows, organization of major ceremonies, harmonization of the various security players (local authorities, military, etc.) sometimes through agreements or even the implementation of quite specific legal tools. On this point, the testimony given on the subject of the security of Mont Saint-Michel was emblematic.

The STR is also required to develop and coordinate emergency “planning” for the protection of heritage¹⁸. In short, it is about integrating heritage into the “risk culture” (e.g. setting up a “blue shield” for the castle of Freÿr in Belgium¹⁹).

The environmental dimension of this public order has been emphasized on several occasions. The STR ensures the “protection of sensitive sites”. It is first and foremost a question of preserving biodiversity (Castle of Freÿr in Belgium²⁰).

State arbitration is called for

Château d’If in Marseille, etc.) but also knowing how to develop renewable energy sources (wind turbines, solar panels, etc.) around remarkable sites by finding suitable solutions so as not to “denature” the sites. The STR also plays a central role in issuing the authorizations required by the legislation for the protection of historic monuments and in particular the authorizations for works (e.g. the International city of the French language housed at the Villers-Cotterêts Castle).

Because the heritage conservation imperative can conflict with certain other public policies (energy change, housing, infrastructure development, etc.), State arbitration is called for. The STR is thus associated with territorial choices in the heritage field, in collaboration with all other players.

Because the maintaining of heritage is becoming harder overall, and the notion of heritage has continued to evolve in the direction of extension, new economic models, based on different funding methods are needed. Thus, by using his “magistracy of influence”²¹, the prefect participates in the coordination of the action of local authorities and partners, both public and private, through “COFIL” meeting in the prefecture (e.g. the City of Carcassonne or the abbey of Cluny).

When a monument is at the heart of a plurality of issues, involving a plurality of agents, the prefect is called “to ensure the coordination of the whole”. It can play a “valuable” role²² “of impetus and conviction when a particular situation demands it at the local level”.

.....

In conclusion, from this first session, it appeared that the STRs are therefore “full-fledged players in asset management on a daily basis”²³. They appear fully legitimate to act on this very symbolic ground of heritage security and they benefit very diverse flexibility. This public heritage action provides STR with additional initiative capacities to build territorial choices in conjunction with other local players.

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The role of the STRs in the Covid-19 crisis management

Faced with a crisis of unprecedented magnitude, it appears that States have mobilized their territorial networks with renewed demands²⁴ both to “embody” the exercise of public action and fully ensure the “permanence of the State”²⁵ but also to involve all local players and first and foremost local elected officials in order to provide a clear, coherent, operational and proportionate response.

In the light of the testimonies gathered during this second session, several lessons can be learned. First of all, the STR plays a “pivot” role in case of a major crisis. This pandemic was the occasion for a “rehabilitation of the State at the territorial level” but the latter must meet the challenge of the crisis of confidence in the institutions.

THE STR, “PIVOT” IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR CRISIS

Only the State territorial network has the responsiveness and tools adapted to meet the requirements of such crisis management²⁶. It was necessary to “set up an agile State”²⁷ capable of being “operational very quickly”²⁸. One of the challenges was to take “uniform decisions”²⁹ and identify pragmatic solutions favorable to a certain continuity of life during periods of lockdown. For this, the setting up of “coordination groups”³⁰ in Finland and “crisis councils” in Norway were invaluable.

 *Balanced, adapted and understandable responses*

The STRs found themselves fully in the role of “pivot” to activate the entire territorial network of the State (army, Regional Health Agency, education services, etc.) and local public and private agents³¹. In this context, the STRs have fully developed their “magistracy of influence”, often qualified as “decisive” to provide, in conjunction with local agents, “balanced, adapted and understandable”³² responses (collaboration with the municipalities

and their elected officials, partnerships with local businesses, in particular through the production of hydroalcoholic gel, or even the use of social networks to answer questions from the population)³³.

Strong institutional relations have been forged, “the Prefect-Mayor couple” in France, “County-municipal governor” in Norway, “District-region” in Finland ... The major role of sub-prefects in a logic of proximity was also emphasized³⁴. The quality of communication and consultation were decisive towards economic and associative players, unions, etc. Subsequently, the increase in the cost of vaccination campaigns and the development of various strategies (end of lockdowns, fight against clusters at Antwerp, transition from crisis management to risk management, etc.) also fully illustrate this need for consultation with local players³⁵. Fundamentally, it appears that the crisis has helped shift the lines in terms of “production of territorial consensus”³⁶.

A “REHABILITATION” OF THE TERRITORIAL STATE

It appears that the proximity of the territorial State, embodied by the STR, with local players, civil society, the need to listen to the population, the search for pragmatic solutions have certainly reinforced the legitimacy of the State which could be dulled by this situation³⁷.

In exceptional circumstances, the “human relationship” is a resource. In this sense, the incarnation of the State by the STR constitutes a major asset in producing coherence in public action. The quality of the permanent dialogue with all of the territorial partners (elected officials, economic players, etc.) has been central to “keeping together” and promoting the acceptability of health measures³⁸. The STR have found themselves everywhere in the front line, especially with citizens. In particular, they were responsible for responding to requests for information from the population and explaining State decisions as positions hostile to health policies developed³⁹.

This acceptability was undoubtedly favored by an adaptation to the crisis and by restrictions proportionate and applicable to the whole territory, in a logic of equity and differentiation⁴⁰ above all. As a result of this crisis, the territorial economic anchoring of State action could also appear to be restored (economic aid in France, increased vigilance in Italy to avoid the penetration of organized crime into the economic fabric, etc.)⁴¹.

In this difficult context, the STRs were undoubtedly able to consolidate the transversal and interministerial dimension of their action by forging a direct and privileged relationship with all the stakeholders (implementation of the recovery plan, economic public policies, etc.) according to a logic of subsidiarity and experimentation.

The result is a certain “resilience”, a more assertive capacity to react to difficult situations. Across the Francophonie, there has been a growing appeal to the State in a crisis situation⁴².

“ *Restoring confidence in public speech* ”

In short, this crisis signals a certain “return of the State”⁴³ and through it, the STR is essential to make “the link between the center and the periphery”.

The last round table was devoted to the delicate question of reconciling freedoms with health security during Covid-19. More importantly, it is the issue of the duration of this crisis that makes the balance between public and individual freedoms and the proportionality of health measures more difficult⁴⁴.

The difficulties in taking drastic measures in terms of freedom were highlighted against the backdrop of the “disinformation society”⁴⁵. The adherence of citizens to the standards enacted⁴⁶ must be sought but it is difficult. More fundamentally, it is about meeting the challenge of a “crisis of confidence” vis-à-vis institutions⁴⁷ and vis-à-vis “public speech”⁴⁸.



In conclusion, several lessons can be drawn from the very rich interventions that have followed one another. It appears, behind the scenes, that this pandemic has been the occasion in all European States of very intense standard-setting activity. Then, an almost paradoxical observation can be made. While this crisis signals a certain “return of the State”, “a “re-legitimized State”⁴⁹ at the territorial level, it also appears that the question now arises of restoring confidence in public speech. It is about “working to restore social ties and citizens’ confidence in institutions”⁵⁰.





NOTES

- 1** Pierre-Etienne Bisch, General Secretary of the EASTR.
- 2** Ignazio Portelli, Prefect, President of ANFACI and the EASTR.
- 3** Renato Saccone, Prefect.
- 4** Laura Lega, Prefect, Head of the Department of Fire, Public Relief and Civil Protection at the Ministry of the Interior, Secretary General of ANFACI.
- 5** Pascale Trimbach, Prefect of Meuse, "Memorial heritage in the Meuse department"
- 6** Philippe Belaval, President of the National Center for Historical Monuments, "The representative of the State in the territory, player and partner in heritage action. French example of the Center of national monuments".
- 7** Idem.
- 8** Ana Luiza Massot, Director of the UNESCO Regional Office for Science and Culture in Europe, Venice. "UNESCO's cultural conventions: the most advanced multilateral framework for the protection of cultural and natural heritage."
- 9** Gérard Gavory, Prefect of Manche, "The security of Mont Saint Michel"
- 10** Ana Luiza Massot.
- 11** Eike Schmidt, Director of the Uffizi Gallery, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Fondo Edifici di Culto.
- 12** Pascale Trimbach.
- 13** And more recently since 2007, on the European scene.
- 14** Ana Luiza Massot.
- 15** Pascale Trimbach.
- 16** Lorenzo Casini, Professor of Administrative Law at the School for Advanced Studies IMT in Lucca and Chief of cabinet at the Ministry of Culture, "The Safety of Cultural Heritage".
- 17** Philippe Belaval.
- 18** Christian Hebrant.
- 19** Antoine Brismé.
- 20** Denis Mathen, Governor of Namur – Christian Hebrant, "The castle of Freÿr and its gardens, a major heritage of Wallonia".
- 21** Christian Hebrant.
- 22** Philippe Belaval.
- 23** Idem.
- 24** Hermann-Josef Klüber, Regierungspräsident of Kassel, Land of Hesse. The fight against the pandemic in Germany - federal challenges and common solutions with ex. of the establishment of vaccination centers.
- 25** Pierre N'Gahane, Prefect of Marne, "The role of the local State in the management of Covid-19".
- 26** Idem.
- 27** Laura Lega.
- 28** Saffet Arkan Bedük, President of the Turkish Association of Governors, "STRs in the fight against Covid-19 in Türkiye".
- 29** Cathy Berx, Gouverneure d'Anvers, Governor of Antwerp, "The role of the State during the pandemic and the wave in Antwerp: supra-local approach to a local resurgence of the pandemic".
- 30** Terttu Savolainen, Director General of the Regional State Administrative Agency for Northern Finland, "Combating the Covid-19 virus at regional level".
- 31** Saffet Arkan Bedük.
- 32** Pierre N'Gahane.
- 33** Nicolas Desforges, Prefect, Vice-President of the Association of Prefectural corps, "State Territorial Representatives facing Covid-19: sharing experiences in the French-speaking world".
- 34** Pierre N'Gahane.
- 35** Sàandor Szabo, Commissaire du gouvernement administratif, « La Hongrie contre le Covid-19 »
- 36** Thierry Bonnier, Prefect of Aude, "The local State strengthened by the management of the health crisis, in search of a local territorial consensus".
- 37** Pierre N'Gahane.
- 38** See for ex., federal pandemic coordination in Cathy Berx, "The role of the State during the pandemic and the wave in Antwerp: supra-local approach to a local resurgence of the pandemic".
- 39** Pierre-Luc Desgagne, Delegate General of Quebec in Brussels.
- 40** Thierry Bonnier.
- 41** Laura Lega.
- 42** Nicolas Desforges.
- 43** Thierry Bonnier.
- 44** Marie Muselle, Belgium.
- 45** Eric Freysselinard, Director of the Institute of Studies of the Ministry of the Interior - IHEMI, former prefect of Meurthe-et-Moselle, "From yellow vests to Covid: have we entered a health dictatorship?"
- 46** Renato Saccone, Prefect of Milan, "Freedom of work and business during the pandemic". See also Anneli Hulthén, Governor, Skane County, Sweden, "The role of county governing Boards during the pandemic".
- 47** Jan Spooren, Governor of Flemish Brabant, "The delicate balance between freedoms and health risks in the face of the Covid-19 crisis".
- 48** Eric Freysselinard.
- 49** Idem.
- 50** Denis Mathen, Governor of Namur. Quoted by Nicolas Desforges, "The State Territorial Representatives facing Covid-19: sharing experiences in the French-speaking world".



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